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Refugee Resettlement

Refugee resettlement, a tradition as old as the United States itself, is an important component of U.S. foreign and domestic policy. This tradition effectively began when those who came to the British colonies fled England seeking a safe haven from religious persecution. Since then, the United States has been involved in a number of major affirmative resettlement efforts. These efforts predate not only the Refugee Act of 1980 but also both World Wars. Over the last fifty years [see Chart 26], resettlement efforts have focused on those fleeing Communism, but even in a post-Cold War era, refugee crises will continue to produce individuals in need of relocation.

The number of refugees and displaced persons requiring international assistance and protection are higher today than ever before, demonstrating the need for a continued, generous humanitarian policy [see Chart 27]. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] estimates that in 1995, there were approximately 27

million people worldwide to whom the agency provided assistance (UNHCR 1995). These included about 16 million refugees who

had fled their home countries because of a well-founded fear of

persecution.

Also included are others in their home country who were assisted and protected under the good offices of UNHCR.¹³ These estimates do not include numerous individuals who have left their countries because of other reasonsnatural disasters or severe economic

deprivation, for example. Also not counted are millions of internally displaced persons who do not receive assistance from UNHCR.

[The breakdown of the 27 million by type and region is shown in Chart 28.]

¹³For example, when large numbers of people are internally or externally displaced by political events, such as civil wars.

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Chart 26.

Refugee Admissions: 1975-1996

1995 = Approved Ceiling

1996 = Projected Ceiling

Total

SE Asia

Soviet Union

Other

Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration

Thousands

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0

Thousands

20000

15000

10000

5000

Chart 27.

World Refugee Population: 1977-1994

Total

East Asia

Africa

Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey

Europe/North America

Middle East/South Asia

Latin America

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Chart 28.

Breakdown by Type & by Region

of Persons of Concern to UNHCR:

1993-1994

TYPE

December 31, 1993

December 31, 1994

27.4

23

18.4

14.5

5.4

4

3.7

3.5

1.8

1.1

Millions

Refugees

Returnees

Internally Displaced

Total

Others of Concern

REGION

11.8

December 31, 1993

Millions

December 31, 1994

8

7.9

7.5

6.5

6.1

1.3

0.9

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.1

Africa

Asia

Europe

Latin

America

North

America

Oceania

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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International crises requiring large-scale resettlement are episodic in nature, and not all crises require third-country resettlement. There is no direct relationship between the number of refugees who require resettlement and the total number of worldwide refugees. Most refugees today remain in their own country, in a neighboring country, or, after some period of time, can return to their countries of origin. In 1980, for example, a far higher percentage of refugees worldwide required resettlement than today because of the reluctance of Southeast Asian countries to receive refugees for first asylum without a pledge of future resettlement.

As important as resettlement is, most refugees never will be relocated in third countries. Resettlement is only one of a number of responses available to the U.S., in conjunction with other nations, to assist and protect refugees. UNHCR views resettlement as the least desirable of three durable solutions to refugee crises, placing higher priority on repatriation and settlement in a neighboring country. While resettlement may be the only solution for some refugees, injudicious use of it can be harmful to others. For example, UNHCR has been reluctant to support large-scale resettlement of Bosnians because of fears that resettlement will send a message that the international community condones "ethnic cleansing." Although history teaches that relocation of oppressed groups may be the only alternative to persecution and, as shown during the Nazi era, even genocide, a fine line exists between protecting those in need and avoiding encouragement of actions that cause refugee movements.

Resettlement also can be harmful if it serves as a magnet attracting people who do not have substantial claims to refugee status and, therefore, little chance of actual admission to a third country. For instance, although many Vietnamese boat people initially did qualify as refugees, the knowledge in Vietnam about third-country resettlement programs, particularly in the United States, later became a mag

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net for many Vietnamese who did not qualify as refugees but who simply wanted to leave Vietnam and viewed the resettlement situation as an opportunity.

Notwithstanding these concerns, resettlement still represents essential protection for a very small percentage of refugees who could not otherwise remain in a country of asylum or who, if forced to remain in their home countries, would face serious harm. UNHCR and its Executive Committee of governments strongly support refugee resettlement under certain limited circumstances: when it provides protection to refugees who would otherwise face refoulement (forced return to a country in which they may face persecution) or other endangerment; and when no other solution is possible.

With passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, the U.S. formalized its long-standing humanitarian commitment to resettle refugees from overseas. The Refugee Act of 1980 provided for regular admissions, as well as a mechanism for emergency admissions when resettlement is needed. Adoption of the Refugee Act represented: a desire for a generous humanitarian response and greater control over the response; a recognition of the importance of flexibility; a desire to eliminate ideological and geographic restrictions on eligibility for refugee admissions and instead to allow admission of refugees of "special humanitarian interest;" and an interest in balancing international concerns and domestic impacts in refugee admissions decisionmaking. The Refugee Act also brought domestic U.S. policy into line with its international commitments. The United States is a signatory to a number of international conventions protecting refugees, including the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The primary definition of a "refugee" used in the Refugee Act drew on the international definition, bringing U.S. law into conformance with international standards.

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Chart 29.

Refugee Definition

"Any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."

In an additional provision, the statute allows the President, under special circumstances, to specify "any person who is within the country of such person's nationality . . . and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" after appropriate consultation. Although the intent of this provision in both the House and Senate was similar, aimed at ensuring flexibility in such cases as political or religious prisoners or dissidents, in practice some 80 percent of all refugees currently resettled in the U.S. are admitted under this secondary provision.

The Refugee Act of 1980 specified that refugee admissions should not exceed 50,000 per year in FY 1980-FY 1982 unless the President determined, after appropriate consultation with Congress, that a higher number was justified by humanitarian concerns or was otherwise in the national interest. The "normal flow" number, as it has since been known, was derived by averaging the number of refugees admitted during the previous decades. Although in no year were actual admissions at the 50,000 level, that number appeared to the drafters of the Refugee Act to be a good index of U.S. commitments to resettlement of refugees. Thereafter, refugee resettlement numbers were to be set annually through consultations between the executive and legislative branches.

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Generally, admission levels and their geographic distribution have reflected both U.S. foreign policy interests and domestic constituent interest in the entry of a particular group. Two major resettlement efforts have dominated the most recent period of U.S. resettlement. First, the U.S. has admitted more than one million Southeast Asian refugees since the end of the Vietnam War, including through international agreements negotiated at the 1979 Geneva conference on Indochinese Refugees and the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action [CPA]. Second, the U.S. has admitted about 425,000 refugees from the Soviet Union (and its successor states) during the same period. With a particular focus on Soviet Jews and other religious minorities, the Soviet resettlement effort accompanied a major human rights initiative that pressed for the right of Soviet residents to leave their own country.

A smaller number of refugees have been admitted as a result of other international commitments. For example, admission levels and distribution take into account the assessment of the UNHCR as to the need for resettlement and priorities for admission. In another example, the U.S. maintains a refugee admission program for particularly vulnerable Bosnians in need of resettlement and for Bosnian Muslim family members of individuals in the U.S. UNHCR also has been successful in requesting resettlement slots for Iraqi refugees in Saudi Arabia, Somali refugees in Kenya, Liberian refugees in Central and West Africa, and Iranian refugees in Iraq.

Given these various inputs into refugee-related decisions, the number of refugees resettled in the U.S. has varied considerably. During the past two decades, since the advent of the large Southeast Asian refugee program, it has ranged from a low of 19,946 in 1977 to a high of 207,116 in 1980 when the U.S. pledged to admit 14,000 Southeast Asian refugees per month if other countries followed this lead. Since 1989, when glasnost and perestroika led to new Soviet agreements on the exit of its nationals and the CPA was negotiated to bring

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Indochinese resettlement to an end, U.S. resettlement has been in the range of 100,000 to 120,000 per year.¹⁴

The Commission strongly affirms that the United States should continue its commitment to resettle refugees as one of several elements of humanitarian protection for the persecuted. Refugee admissions fulfill a humanitarian commitment to provide protection and assistance to those who otherwise would be persecuted or endangered.

Many observers believe that refugee resettlement is, in concept, the most compelling element of our immigration program because it provides rescue for individuals who might otherwise be killed or persecuted. Aside from its humanitarian objective, resettlement also serves other important national interests. For instance, resettlement can help stabilize situations that might otherwise create conditions of regional and international insecurity. The rapid, unplanned movements of large numbers of people can destabilize the governments of neighboring countries, thrusting them into conflicts themselves. Moreover, countries of first asylum that now accept refugees temporarily until they can be resettled would be less likely to provide protection without the guarantee of eventual resettlement elsewhere. As an example, Malaysia argued for the resettlement of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam because of a concern that the presence of these refugees would cause conflict between its own ethnic Chinese population and the majority Malay population.

The Commission strongly affirms that the United States should continue its

commitment to resettle refugees

as one of several elements of

humanitarian protection for

the persecuted.

Refugee admissions fulfill a

humanitarian commitment to provide protection and assistance

to those who otherwise would

be persecuted

or endangered.

¹⁴These numbers do not include individuals who seek asylum in the United States. In contrast to refugees who seek resettlement overseas, asylum seekers have already come to the U.S. There are about 450,00 asylum cases pending at INS as of July 1995, including 100,000 cases that were added in FY 1995. It is projected 12,500 asylum cases will be approved by INS in FY 1995. Under current law, up to 10,000 asylees may adjust to permanent status each year. Beginning in January 1995, the asylum system has undergone changes designed to expedite review of new asylum claims, reduce the backlog, and deter abuse of the system. The Commission is examining the impact of these provisions and will report its findings to Congress at a later date.

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It is in the national interest for the United States to play a leadership role in the world community, including a role in the agencies that address international refugee crises. A U.S. commitment to resettle refugees encourages other countries to do the same. Withdrawal of this commitment likely would leave many refugees vulnerable. As a principal funder of the international refugee and humanitarian system, the United States also has a national interest in ensuring that refugee crises come to a rapid, humane conclusion. Resettlement can be particularly useful if a U.S. pledge prompts commitments by other countries that bring the crisis to a close.

Resettlement can serve other foreign policy interests of the United States as well. Designating particular groups for resettlement may make governments aware that others are scrutinizing their treatment of domestic groups. Resettlement also helps maintain the idea of the U.S. as a beacon of hope, freedom, and democracy. Even groups that support significant reductions in other types of immigrant admissions and question the priorities and integrity of the current refugee resettlement program argue in favor of keeping a category for refugee resettlement.

While the Commission continues to review a variety of issues related to refugee resettlement, it is providing interim recommendations at this time to demonstrate how refugee resettlement and other humanitarian issues fit into the tripartite system proposed by the Commission and to affirm its commitment to and desire for a strong, sustained refugee resettlement program. Recognizing that refugee situations may vary dramatically from year to year and that only

a tiny fraction of the world's 16-plus million refugees require third

-country resettlement, the Commission supports a flexible and responsive refugee resettlement system that includes a statutory target number of annual admissions with procedures to exceed the target if conditions require. A statutory target number ensures a continuing

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U.S. commitment to resettle refugees, as did the Refugee Act of 1980. More specifically, the Commission proposes that, on an interim basis:

The U.S. should allocate 50,000 admission numbers each year

to the entry of refugees from overseas (not including asylum

adjustments).

Allocating a target number of refugee admissions, with provisions to exceed this number with direct and affirmative Congressional participation, or by the President unilaterally in case of an emergency, ensures a continued U.S. commitment to resettlement in the post-Cold War era.

The Commission derives its recommendation of a target number of 50,000 refugees per year from an analysis of three issues: U.S. resettlement patterns during the past decades; the UNHCR assessment of refugee resettlement needs; and the capacity of U.S. agencies involved in refugee resettlement to maintain the infrastructure needed for resettlement.

As discussed above, there has been considerable variation in the number of refugees admitted to this country during the past two decades. More recently, resettlement has averaged about 120,000 admissions per year, of which about 80 percent came from the two large programs referenced above, the Southeast Asian and Soviet refugee initiatives. Other than these two special national origins programs, there was a steady average of 20,000 refugees admitted from throughout the rest of the world. [See Chart 30 for FY 1990-1995 summary of U.S. refugee admissions by region.]

The two major programs that have dominated recent U.S. refugee admissions already are phasing down. In conformance with international agreements, resettlement of Southeast Asians is coming to a close in 1996, with the end of the CPA and the expected closing of the camps in countries of first asylum. Moreover, almost all political

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Chart 30.

Summary of Refugee Admissions

to the U.S.: FY 1990-1995

FY 1990 FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995*

Africa 3,494 4,424 5,491 6,969 5,856 7,000

Asia 51,611 53,486 51,848 49,858 43,581 40,000

Eastern Europe/

Former Soviet Union 56,912 45,516 64,184 51,278 51,247 48,000

Latin America 2,309 2,237 2,924 4,126 6,437 8,000

Near East Asia 4,991 5,359 6,844 7,000 5,861 5,000

Private Sector Initiative 3,009 1,789 882 251 - 2,000

TOTAL 122,326 112,811 132,173 119,482 112,682 112,000

*Admissions Ceiling

Source: U.S. Department of State

Chart 31.

UNHCR Summary of Projected

Resettlement Needs: 1991-1995

Region of Origin 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Africa 7,140 8,330 10,730 10,550 8,650

South, East, & Southeast Asia 56,680 26,530 21,180 18,650 650

Europe 400 790 200* ** ***

Latin America 200 200 150 60 60

Middle East & Southwest Asia 8,200 6,440 39,760 29,600 22,500

TOTAL 75,620 42,290 72,020 58,860 31,900

Disabled Medically-at-Risk & 959 710 1,250 1,165 960

Victims of Violence/Torture (cases) (cases) (cases) (cases) (cases)

Women at Risk 293 890 380 550 525

(cases) (cases) (cases) (cases) (cases)

* Excluding former Yugoslavia

** 40,000 places offered for temporary protection and resettlement of refugees from former Yugoslavia

*** Out of the 50,000 places offered since October 1992, there are approximately 20,000 places still available

Source: UNHCR Resettlement Section

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prisoners and Amerasians who qualify for resettlement directly from

Vietnam will have been admitted by the end of 1996. With the recent normalization of relations with Vietnam, it is expected that the

flow of Vietnamese to the United States will continue, but in

the form of family-reunification immigration visas, rather than refugee admissions.

With regard to the former Soviet Union, it is harder to predict if, and when, resettlement will end. As the political situation in a number of the republics is unstable and persecution against religious minorities has been a common response to political insecurity, resettlement may continue to be needed. However, many expect the number of refugees applying from the former Soviet Union to continue to decline if democracy and respect for human rights are solidified and if the United States and former Soviet countries strengthen their friendships. About 125,000 Soviet Jews are in the pipeline for refugee admissions to the United States. Approximately 50,000 already have received INS approval and are in various stages of trying to depart. Another 50,000 have applied and appear to be eligible and to meet U.S. priorities. They are awaiting their assigned interviews. The remainder are new applicants who are expected to meet criteria for admission; they are now applying at the rate of about 2,000 per month. There are more than 500,000 who have applied but do not fit

the criteria for approval of applications and new applications do come in which are not eligible. There is no way to predict the expected rate of applications once these numbers are cleared, but the pool of eligible candidates has been reduced substantially by prior resettlement.

With the end of these two programs, if admissions decisions continue to be made in the current ad hoc fashion, some refugee advocates fear that refugee admissions may drastically decrease. Both programs have had important domestic constituencies and the entry of these refugees served vital foreign policy interests during the Cold

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War. Whether a similar confluence of influences would provide support for entry of lesser known, though potentially as deserving, refugee groups is questionable. The last year in which neither Southeast Asian nor Soviet refugee admissions played a significant role in resettlement1977saw only 19,000 entries. The Commission believes, however, that refugee resettlement is an important component of U.S. humanitarian policy and must be maintained. A 50,000 statutory target helps ensure the existence of admissions numbers for refugees from countries that lack a domestic constituency or foreign policy interest.

The 50,000 target is more than double the current level of non-

Southeast Asian and non-Soviet arrivals. It also exceeds the current number of refugees worldwide for whom the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has determined that third-country resettlement is the only solution. Projected UNHCR resettlement needs totaled 31,900 in 1995, not counting refugees from ex-Yugoslavia for whom governments had already pledged a total of 50,000 places since October, 1992, of which approximately 20,000 remain available. The resettlement assessment of needs has averaged 56,138 over the last five years. [See Chart 31 for UNHCR Summary of Projected Resettlement Needs].

The Commission heard testimony that UNHCR's assessment seriously underestimates the number of refugees requiring resettlement. Seeing resettlement as a costly, last resort for refugees, UNHCR tends to request resettlement for only those refugees who face life-

threatening or similarly serious repercussions in their country of asylum. The UNHCR assessment does not include individuals still trapped within their own countries whose lives or safety could be ensured if resettlement is granted. Finally, the assessment does not take into account the resettlement of individuals with close family members in resettlement countries who do not face particular danger in a country of asylum.

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Having heard these criticisms of the UNHCR resettlement numbers, the Commission agrees that the reported need for resettlement may be seriously underestimated. However, even if the resettlement need were triple the UNHCR assessment of 31,000, a target of 50,000 U.S. admission numbers should be sufficient to enable the United States to take half of the world's refugees requiring resettlement. As discussed below, the United States should take leadership in helping to ensure that the remaining resettlement needs are met by other countries [see Chart 32].

Chart 32.

Countries Providing

Resettlement Quotas Annually*

(as of October 1994)

Resettlement Fiscal/ Overall Quota (persons)

Countries Planning

Calendar 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 994/95

Australia 1/7-30/6 14,000 12,000 12,000 13,000 13,000

Canada 1/1-31/12 13,000 13,000 13,000 11,000 7,300

Private Private

Sponsorship Sponsorship

Denmark** 1/1-31/12 522 500 500 500 500

Finland** 1/1-31/12 500 500 500 500 500

The Netherlands** 1/1-31/12 500 500 500 600 500

Norway** 1/1-31/12 1,175 1,000 1,000 1,000 200

New Zealand 1/7-30/6 1,000 800 800 800 800

Sweden*** 1/7-30/6 1,250 2,000 2,000 1,000 1,800

Switzerland*** 1991-1994 2,000 (four years inclusive)

U.S.A. 1/10-30/9 125,000 142,000 142,000 132,000 121,000

*Refugee Resettlement Quotas in this update do not include other intakes through In-country or

Immigration processing, nor special places provided for Resettlement and/or Temporary Protection

of refugees from former Yugoslavia.

**Additional Family Reunion Admission outside refugee quota

***Family reunion of immediate links admission outside quota

Source: UNHCR Resettlement Section

+ 4,600

+ 6,000

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The target of 50,000 annual refugee admissions also is consistent with the State Department's own preliminary projections of expected future refugee admissions. In FY 1997, the State Department projects 70,000 admissions, down from 90,000 in FY 1996. For FY 1998, the projection is 50,000 refugee admissions.

The capacity of the resettlement infrastructure is the last consideration that the Commission examined in making a recommendation on resettlement numbers. The United States should not accept an inappropriately large number of refugees solely to maintain this infrastructure. However, given the recurrence of refugee crises that have, and will, require a U.S. resettlement response and the rapidity with which the response will be needed, it is essential to maintain a capacity to respond to such crises. A target of 50,000 refugee admissions, justifiable on the grounds described above, will help ensure the viability of private and public agencies that would find it difficult to sustain their capacity if resettlement fell below that level.

As with our recommendations in other areas, the Commission believes that fundamental reform requires a period of transition prior to implementation of the new system. This transition should include prudent, measured steps and take into account current and projected refugee resettlement, the availability of funds, the particular circumstances of certain individuals, and the extent to which the international burdensharing capacities are in place.

It will take several years to reach the target number of 50,000 refugee admissions per year. The 125,000 Soviet applications currently in the pipeline represent one source of concern about an overly-abrupt

transition. As in family immigration, the transition period might include clearance of the pipeline as expeditiously as possible. It is not in keeping with the objectives of a resettlement program to require individuals who meet the refugee definition and other

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U.S. criteria to wait unduly for entry. Such waits can place them

in danger.

Other than in emergency situations, refugee admissions could

exceed the 50,000 admission level only with more direct and affirmative participation by Congress than occurs in the current consultation process.

The need for resettlement varies greatly from year to year, as refugee crises are episodic. Considerable flexibility is needed in U.S. resettlement policy to respond to such variation.

The Commission believes that our admissions system must have a procedure to exceed the target number of refugee admissions when circumstances require. In some cases, a refugee crisis can be handled expeditiously and the emergency procedure discussed below will be sufficient. At other times, it will be necessary for the United States to make a sustained commitment to resettlement of a particular group or groups in numbers that exceed the target over a period of years. These pledges can be essential parts of the resolution of a refugee crisis. An example is the Comprehensive Plan of Action by which resettlement countries pledged to admit the longstaying Vietnamese refugee population while the Southeast Asian countries agreed to establish screening procedures and voluntary repatriation efforts.

The Commission further believes any increase in admission numbers must include active Congressional participation. A procedure with direct and affirmative participation by Congress provides legislative authority over decisions on exceeding the statutory target. The Commission also recognizes that while consultation with Congress is already part of the law, reality does not conform to intent. Reform of the current consultation process is needed to ensure appropriate Congressional oversight of decisions to exceed the 50,000 target.

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The Refugee Act requires an annual "appropriate consultation" on refugee admissions. Specifically, it requires in-person discussions by designated Cabinet representatives of the President with the House and Senate Judiciary Committees to review the worldwide refugee situation, project the extent of possible U.S. resettlement, and justify the proposed admissions by humanitarian concerns or national interest. The Administration also is supposed to provide information on: the nature of the refugee situation; the number and allocation of the refugees to be admitted and an analysis of their country conditions; proposed plans and costs for their movement and resettlement; the anticipated social, economic, and demographic impact of their admission to the U.S.; the extent to which other countries admit and assist in refugee resettlement; the impact of U.S. participation in refugee resettlement on foreign policy interests; and other issues as

requested.

Several problems arise with the process. First, the consultation process does not provide sufficient opportunity for those on the authorizing committees in Congress to modify or override Executive Branch proposals and decisions regarding refugee resettlement numbers or their distribution. Second, the consultation process is criticized because it comes too late to be meaningful. Consultations often have taken place just before the start of the fiscal year. By the time the consultations have occurred, the appropriations committees generally have taken action on the resettlement budgets requested by the Department of State, INS, and the Office of Refugee Resettlement predicated on assumptions about admissions numbers the following year. This disconnect between the number of admissions and appropriation of funds damages the system's credibility. Moreover, in recent years, there has been a decrease in funding for resettlement assistance and a lack of coordination in matching assistance dollars to admissions levels. A responsible system should provide the necessary resources for those refugees who are admitted and should not admit those for whom it cannot provide appropriately.

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Third, the consultations are meant to ensure that both international and domestic considerations are weighed in making decisions on entry. In preparing its arguments for overall numbers and their distribution, the Executive Branch is to: analyze the anticipated social, economic, and demographic impact of the admission of refugees; provide information on the extent to which other countries will admit and assist in the resettlement of such refugees; and assess the impact of the participation of the United States in the resettlement of the refugees on our foreign policy interests. In practice, however, these analyses are often pro forma. The consultations generally have not provided an opportunity for experts and others to give their views on the domestic or foreign policy impacts.

The Commission is considering a mechanism whereby Congressional participation would be more direct and affirmative than it is currently. Some pending legislation would require special legislation to exceed the 50,000 target. A requirement for separate legislation could, however, impede decisions on refugee admissions. Other mechanisms building on existing Congressional processes might be a better alternative. For instance, a consultation between the executive

and legislative branches could be required to accompany the appropriations process if the request were greater than 50,000, with the appropriation of funds for that number of refugees representing the affirmative participation by Congress in the decision to exceed the target. If the Administration proposal were under the 50,000 target, no consultation would be necessary prior to appropriation of funds. If after the consultations, the Congressional committees believed that the number proposed by the President was too high or too low, the appropriations process could address these concerns.

Having an earlier consultation should not negatively affect decisionmaking. There is already a lag time between application for admission and entry into the United States. While the wait should be kept to a minimum, particularly for refugees who are to be re

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settled because they are endangered, some delay is inevitable. As refugees are processed months before they depart, the State Department usually has a good sense of potential numbers well before the start of the fiscal year. Should a crisis arise between the time of the consultation and the start of the fiscal year, the emergency admissions procedure could be used.

In the case of an emergency, the President may authorize the admission of additional refugees upon certification of the emergency circumstances necessitating such action. The Congress may prevent the emergency admissions only with a two-house veto of the Presidential action.

Under current law, the President may set a number of refugees to be admitted in response to an emergency refugee situation after determining, following appropriate consultation, that such an unforeseen emergency refugee situation exists and that the admission of certain refugees is justified by grave humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national interest.

Such emergencies are infrequent. Since passage of the Refugee Act, there have been only two times where the President has certified such an emergency.¹⁵ Earlier examples include the resettlement of Hungarian refugees after the Soviet invasion in 1956 and resettlement of Vietnamese refugees after the fall of Saigon. In each case, immediate action was needed. Under the Commission's recommendation, the President would have the authority to respond unilaterally in such emergencies. While consultations would be desirable and should be pursued if possible, the President should have the ability to act swiftly, particularly if Congress is not in session. As decisions on such admissions are often exercised as part of the han

¹⁵Emergency consultations were held in 1988 and 1989 to raise the ceilings for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union due to the large outflow caused by the collapse of Communism.

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dling of a foreign policy crisis, the authority to declare a refugee resettlement emergency is consistent with the President's other authorities. The Commission encourages the Executive Branch to plan for the expeditious entry of refugees, having determined such a crisis exists. At present, the refugee resettlement program is often managed through waiting lists that go beyond the expected lag time between application and admission. Backlogs in a refugee program raise serious questions. If individuals are truly endangered, requiring them to wait for resettlement makes little humanitarian sense. If they can wait in relative safety, their refugee bona fides may be questionable. The Congress could prevent emergency admissions only with a two-house veto.

The U.S. should take leadership in generating international responses to refugee crises, with particular focus on international burdensharing and regional solutions. Future policies also much take into account the relative weight to be given resettlement versus other avenues open to the U.S. to help protect and assist refugees worldwide.

As discussed in the Commission's last report, the most effective, though all too often elusory, means of handling mass migratory movements is through early warning and prevention. Many crises are predictable. Targeting resources in areas where such international assistance may prevent mass migrations or deterioration of unstable situations may alleviate refugee movements and the need for resettlement. Improving contingency planning and emergency preparedness will help ensure a coordinated, efficient effort to assist and protect refugees should prevention fail.

The United States can provide financial and material assistance to refugees overseas, both directly and through nongovernmental organizations [see Chart 33]. More effective programs for the care and maintenance of refugees, until such time as they are able to return to their countries of origin, would provide greater opportunities for

The U.S. should take leadership

in generating international responses

to refugee crises, with particular focus on

international burdensharing

and regional

solutions.

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refugees to live in safety and dignity in countries of asylum. Adequate nutrition and access to primary health care are essential. Assistance programs that focus on skills development can prove vital in helping prepare refugees for repatriation or local settlement. Attention to the specific requirements of the large majority of women and children who comprise refugee populations will further improve conditions as well as prepare refugees for the future.

Chart 33.

FY 1996 Budget Request

for Migration and Refugee Assistance

TOTAL ASSISTANCE $671,000,000

Refugees to Israel

$80,000,000

Administrative Expenses

$12,000,000

Refugee Admissions

$126,300,000

Multiregional Activities

$51,100,000

South Asia

$22,000,000

Near East

$87,800,000

Europe

$85,000,000

OVERSEAS ASSISTANCE

$452,700,000

Western Hemisphere

$10,000,000

Africa

$169,100,000

East Asia

$27,700,000

Source: Department of State Congressional Budget Presentation, FY 1996 Migration and Refugee Assistance

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The United States can exert leadership by working with other governments to help formulate and provide such aid. It also can work with other governments to find support for durable solutions, with a particular focus on voluntary repatriation. A side benefit of the end of the Cold War has been the potential for millions of refugees to return to home countries. Many refugees were displaced by civil wars and other conflicts that had roots in the superpower rivalries. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, many of these conflicts have come to a resolution. Refugees from such countries as Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Afghanistan, El Salvador, and Nicaragua have returned or will soon be able to return to their homelands. While peace is not at hand in all of these countries and new refugee movements have erupted in some, the possibilities for repatriation have never been greater.

U.S. leadership in international efforts to support refugee resettlement also will help resolve and even avert refugee crises. U.S. resettlement of refugees helps promote burdensharing and encourages other countries to accept refugees in need of resettlement. Further, U.S. refugee processing done in-country may help other countries, as individuals who can exit their country directly for the U.S. will not pose a burden on neighboring countries to which they might otherwise flee.

Resettlement involves a range of international organizations (UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration being the most prominent), governments, and international voluntary agencies. The U.S. is joined in its efforts on behalf of refugees by a number of other countries. Canada and Australia are other prominent resettlement countries. Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and other European countries offer smaller resettlement quotas, often directed towards highly vulnerable groups. These countries, and others, also contribute money to international refugee aid agencies [see Chart 34]. Finally, private agencies from the U.S. and other countries provide assistance to refu

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gees overseas, identify refugees in need of resettlement, and participate in the screening of refugees to determine if they meet a country's eligibility criteria.

Some suggest the further internationalizing of resettlement, both worldwide and regionally. This could include sharing resettlement numbers (e.g., each country could take a certain percentage of the people requiring resettlement) and financial contributions above and beyond the resources that the U.S. would spend on resettling individuals of particular interest to the U.S. Concerns exist, however,

Chart 34.

1993 Contributions to International Refugee Aid Agencies

(Ranked by contribution per capita)

Country Contribution Population Contributions GNP Per

Per Capita (in millions) (in millions Capita

(in US $) of U.S. $) (in U.S. $)

Norway 14.12 4.3 60.71 24.16

Sweden 11.31 8.7 98.43 25.49

Denmark 8.14 5.2 42.31 23.66

Netherlands 6.46 15.2 98.20 18.56

Switzerland 5.56 7.0 38.95 33.51

Luxembourg 2.95 0.4 1.18 31.08

Finland 2.50 5.1 12.72 24.40

United States 1.74 258.3 451.99 22.56

Canada 1.68 28.1 47.10 21.26

United Kingdom 1.48 58.0 85.62 16.75

Kuwait 1.15 1.7 1.95 n/a

Japan 1.14 124.8 141.99 26.92

France 0.95 57.7 54.55 20.60

Belgium 0.92 10.1 9.26 19.30

Australia 0.68 17.8 12.04 16.59

Germany 0.66 81.1 53.36 23.65

Austria 0.50 7.9 3.95 20.38

Italy 0.50 57.8 28.93 18.58

Ireland 0.43 3.6 1.53 10.78

New Zealand 0.25 3.4 0.86 12.14

Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1994

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that a multilateral approach may rely too heavily on UNHCR determinations, particularly if UNHCR serves as a gatekeeper rather than a resource to help identify refugees for resettlement.

The UNHCR numbers, for example, do not include individuals still within their own countries, although the U.S. program focuses heavily on such persons. Some argue that if UNHCR has too great a say in determining who is resettled in the United States, it would limit U.S. sovereignty in choosing who should be admitted. It is essential that the United States continue to play a leadership role to ensure effective burdensharing that serves U.S. national interests as well as international humanitarian needs.

Resettlement should not occur at the expense of assistance and protection of refugees internationally, nor should resettlement practices or funding impede prevention and solution of refugee crises. Some critics have pointed out that the same amount of money used to resettle one refugee could support enhanced assistance and protection for hundreds of refugees overseas. The General Program of the UNHCR, one measure of the resources expended on assistance and protection, is targeted at $429 million for calendar year 1995. In addition to basic assistance and protection, UNHCR responds to new refugee crises with emergency aid. At times, as in the programs in Rwanda and Bosnia, the emergency responses can require large sums of money. UNHCR also expends resources on repatriation efforts, projects to help refugees settle locally, programs to support increased economic self-reliance in refugee camps, and other activities aimed at finding durable solutions to refugee crises. The special program budget at UNHCR that supports these additional activities is targeted at $783 million for calendar year 1995. Together the general and special program budgets total $1.27 billion, approximately $47 per capita for each of the approximately 27 million refugees aided by UNHCR. [This figure does not include direct expenditures by governments or private agencies in meeting the needs of refugees.]

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By contrast, according to the President's Report to Congress on Proposed Refugee Admissions (DOS 1994), the estimated costs to support the resettlement of about 110,000 refugees in FY 1995 were $598.5 million [see Chart 35].¹⁶ The request is similar for FY 1996, with a total of $598.9 for the funded admission of up to 110,000 refugee and entrant arrival.¹⁷ This includes $170 million by the Department of State [DOS] for Refugee Processing, Language/Orientation Programs Overseas, Transportation, and Reception and Placement; $414.2 by the Department of Health and Human Services [HHS] for Transitional and Medical Services, Employment Services, Targeted Assistance, and Preventive Health; and $14.7 million by the Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS] for Refugee Processing. By dividing the amount of money by the number of admissions, one might then estimate the federal per capita cost of resettlement at $5,440.

The Commission has learned, however, that the complexity of the system makes it difficult to determine a federal per capita cost. Not all federal costs would be included in the above estimate, nor can all costs be disaggregated. For instance, substantial state and local costs (e.g., public education, for which reliable estimates often are not available) as well as private funds are expended on resettlement. Further, certain programs, such as transitional and medical services, include state-administered cash and medical assistance. It is also difficult to estimate per capita refugee costs because refugees (unless they became U.S. citizens) have been indefinitely eligible for refugee program services. Thus, although a refugee may have entered ten

¹⁶The total listed on Chart 35 is $704.3 million. This number includes an estimate of other HHS costs, such as AFDC, Medicaid, and SSI, which is simply a projection from 1991 numbers, the last year for which this information was collected.

¹⁷As in FY 1995, the total does not include the costs associated with AFDC, Medicaid, or SSI programs since, according to ORR, very little data are available on these costs. In addition, while refugee admissions are expected to be around 90,000 in FY 1996, the admission of 20,000 Cuban entrants raises the FY 1996 total to approximately 110,000 funded admissions.

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years ago, he or she may still have used services along with newly arrived refugees. In June 1995, however, ORR finalized a rule limiting the amount of time that refugees remain eligible to receive certain assistance programs to five years, consistent with the amount of time needed to acquire U.S. citizenship.

Money saved on resettlement will not necessarily go to support

international action, particularly as much of the expense of resettlement is born by domestic agencies (HHS, state and local governments, and private voluntary agencies) whose budgets would not be tapped for overseas aid. Generally, only the Department of State's domestic and international refugee budgets are fungible. Moreover, the refugees who do need resettlement may not be the same ones who benefit as a result of increased international aid (for example, those who would be involuntarily returned to their country of origin would no longer be where they could receive international protection). Many refugee crises call for a combination of responses, not an either/or approach of repatriation or resettlement. Even where the large majority of refugees can repatriate, a smaller number may not be able to return and will require settlement in a country of first asylum or resettlement in a third country. Moreover, the funds spent on resettlement are one-time only expenditures, often recouped when the refugees pay taxes. The per capita funds spent on care

and maintenance may continue for many years until a solution

is possible.

However, even with such qualifying comments, the per capita costs of U.S. resettlement are very much higher than U.S. assistance to refugees abroad. For this and other reasons, resettlement slots should be allocated with care as a valuable and scarce opportunity. Better understanding of the very large differences in the costs of resettlement versus overseas assistance also could improve budgetary allocations among domestic and international agencies and, thereby,

ensure that available refugee resources are used most effectively to

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Chart 35.

Estimated Costs (in $ millions) of Refugee Processing, Movement and Resettlement: FY 1995

AGENCY ESTIMATED FUNDING

DEPARTMENT OF STATE:

Bureau for Refugee Programs

Refugee Processing 18.6

Language/Orientation Programs Overseas 6.1

Transportation 71.6

Reception & Placement 73.7

Subtotal 170.0

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES

Administration for Children and Families:

Office of Refugee Resettlement

Transitional and Medical Services 278.1

Employment Service 80.8

Targeted Assistance 49.4

Preventive Health 5.5

Subtotal 413.8

OTHER HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES

Family Support Payments to States 56.4

Medicaid 25.2

Supplemental Security Income 24.2

Subtotal 105.8

DEPTARTMENT OF JUSTICE:

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Refugee Processing, Initial Interviewing and

other Considerations of Applicants 10.6

Soviet Processing 4.1

Subtotal 14.7

GRAND TOTAL 704.3

Figures are based on the Administration's budget request for FY 1995, for the funded admission of up to 110,000 refugees. At the time this report was prepared, Congress had not completed action on this request.

Source: Department of State, Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY1995.

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assist, protect, and find durable solutions for the millions of refugees worldwide.

The Commission recommends a thorough assessment of the criteria used to admit refugees for resettlement.

The contexts for making future policy regarding refugee resettlement are in flux. The refugee resettlement program must be revamped to meet the needs of a post-Cold War world. For instance, while the number of Cold War refugees has dwindled, the extreme nationalism and ethnic conflicts prevalent in today's world continue to produce massive population displacements and refugee flows. Resettlement criteria should take into account the protection of refugees who otherwise would be endangered in a country of origin or asylum and who would have no other alternatives. Meanwhile, the resolution of Cold War conflicts is permitting superpower cooperation and large-scale voluntary repatriation.

Both critics and proponents of current U.S. policy recognize that the end