B I N A T I O N A L S T U D Y

E S T U D I O B I N A C I O N A L

Migration has repercussions through labor market supply and demand, through fiscal implications for national and local governments, and on political and social institutions. Some of the differences in perspectives on migration's impactsfavorable or adversecome from very real differences observed in the populations in each country. In Mexico, those who return most often are the sojourners who may bring some benefits of their U.S. experience back with them. In the United States, it is the settler population, often older and sometimes unauthorized, whose relatively low skills place them at a disadvantage in an "information age" economy. Thus, disparate pictures emerge depending upon which end of the telescope one looks through.

Migration has many impacts on Mexican national development, the most studied of which are the economic consequences flowing from migrant remittances and from the interaction of labor supply and demand in Mexico and the United States. Numerous caveats must accompany any conclusions about the impacts of migration in Mexico, including variations in impacts across regions and through time and national-level versus regional or community- specific effects. Migrants originate from villages, towns, and cities throughout Mexico, but intense migration is most heavily concentrated in just 109 of Mexico's more than 2,400 municipalities (similar to U.S. counties) and in 9 western and northern states. And today's migration, while increasingly of an urban character, remains strongly influenced by rural conditions.

Distinctions also need to be drawn between communities with a "long tradition" of migration and those more recently incorporated into migratory flows, for migration experience shapes impacts. The nature of a community's migrant flowstemporary, recurrent or permanentwill create variations in impacts. Most of the information available to estimate effects of migration comes from community studies, many of which do not cover the full range of possible impacts. Special attention has been given to remittances and their effects on the well-being of migrants, their families and their communities. Most detailed studies to date have focused on rural areas in a few states, and more research clearly remains to be done.

MEXICOESTADOS UNIDOS SOBRE MIGRACION

MIGRATION BETWEEN MEXICO & THE UNITED STATES

Economic

Effects

Remittances to Mexico and National Multiplier Effects. Migrant remittances represent the most direct and measurable benefits of international migration on Mexico (Lozano 1993). The benefits received by the communities from remittances depend on: (1) the number of households with migrants employed abroad; (2) the relative importance of remittances as compared with other sources of income (estimates of remittances as a proportion of income from all sources range from 5 to 93 percent); and (3) on whether or not the community is capable of retaining the multiplying effects of remittances. It is common for the benefits derived from consumption and investment to be concentrated in the important regional cities. The diversion of remittances to these regional centers is a topic that merits special attention.

Remittances of permanent migrants represent about two-thirds of the total, and as these migrants tend to reduce their remittances as time passes, it is anticipated that their contributions will diminish in the future.

Temporary migrants, on the other hand, incur higher costs of mobility (especially if they are unauthorized), lesser residential costs, and lesser costs for the United States due to their limited demands on health, education, and other services.

At the national level, remittances reached a considerable overall figure of

between U.S. $2.5 and U.S. $3.9 billion in 1995. Remittances are equivalent to more than one-half (57 percent) of the foreign exchange available through foreign direct investment in the same year. This represents a little less than

5 percent of the foreign exchange obtained by Mexico for the export of goods.

Remittances over time are mostly concentrated in the same few states and areas of origin. There the remittances have greater economic importance. For

example, in the state of Zacatecas, migrant income was higher than federal revenues in 1988.

The amount remitted per migrant was around U.S. $700 in 1995, but this figure is very different for permanent and temporary migrants. Alternatively, the net amount of remittances per receiving household is equivalent to one average wage in places of origin. In a context in which 60 percent of households' earnings are below that average, the amount remitted is of great importance.

To gauge the full effect of remittances, one needs to measure more than just the quantity of remittances and how they are spent. Economic simulations of

B I N A T I O N A L S T U D Y

E S T U D I O B I N A C I O N A L

remittances attempt to estimate these complex effects (Taylor 1996). Estimates represent not only the direct effect of migrant remittances on the households that receive them, but also the indirect effects across all households that result from their spending. Remittances produce the largest income multiplier when they flow into Mexico's rural households, whose consumption and expenditure patterns favor goods produced domestically with relatively labor-intensive production technologies and few imported inputs. When migrant remittances go to urban households, more of the money leaks out of the country in the form of import demand. Based on these multiplier estimations, which are partial pictures of a complex reality, it estimated that for every dollar sent or brought into Mexico the gross national product [GNP] increases by about U.S. $2.90. Each dollar in remittances may translate into an increase of U.S. $0.3 to U.S. $0.4 in the income of small farmers and rural workers; and U.S. $1.10 in the income of urban-worker households (although urban households do not receive most remittance dollars, they benefit from rural household's demand for urban goods and services) (Adelman & Taylor 1990).

As the North American economy becomes increasingly integrated, remittance multipliers in Mexico are likely to decrease as production in Mexico responds more to demand in the North American market as a whole and less to demand in Mexico alone. In a North American free trade area, migration may affect production and incomes in Mexico in new ways.

There is a wide variety of migration experiences among the migrants; these differences are reflected in remittances. Frequently, especially now, remittances are limited to covering families' expenditures with nothing going to savings. In such cases, remittances may still have a relatively high impact on those families as this income becomes a sort of survival insurance.

Remittances are also dependent upon circumstances that might reduce their

importance. At the extreme, up to one-third of return migrants do not manage to send remittances or take money home with them upon return. In other cases, the earnings that finally reach families are not high, partly because there are considerable losses in the remittances, but above all because migrants have heavy expenses both on the journeys to the U.S. and back and during their working stay in the U.S. These expenses are generally greater for unauthorized migrants than for residents or for temporary migrants with documents. There is some evidence that migrant wages recently have dropped and of labor competition among Mexican migrants themselves. Also, particularly in agriculture, it is common to face

MEXICOESTADOS UNIDOS SOBRE MIGRACION

MIGRATION BETWEEN MEXICO & THE UNITED STATES

periods without work and, therefore, without income. For these reasons, remittances for such families are cyclical, unstable, and unequal.

In contrast, some studies suggest that there are workers in more stable work and some who manage to obtain employment more quickly, perhaps because of their previous experience or their contracts through established networks. In such cases, their savings, after deducting expenses, can be anticipated and more efficiently channeled to their families.

Remittances, Investment, and Development. Remittances have two types of impact on communities. In most cases remittances become a source of support for family consumption, housing improvement, and basic urban services. Yet, other communities show productive changes in which the remittances play an important role as a source of investment. On occasion that role is complementary to the development process driven by other local and regional forces.

The impacts can be shown by using social accounting matrices. These have been constructed for a handful of specific communities, estimating different multiplying effects of remittances. These effects vary depending on the degree of development previously reached by the localities, as well as on their economic links with other communities and on the importance of remittances in relation to other income in the community. It is clear that when a sending village does not

have an adequate source of income, remittances are of paramount

importance.

Other studies we have carried out suggest similar trends with respect to the relationship between "migratory intensity," migratory "trajectory" in time, and the economic performance of communities. In localities where the wage of the formal sector is greater, lower rates of migratory activity are observed. Similarly, higher wages are related to a reduction in migratory intensity over time. Of course, the causality may run in either direction, but it is important to suggest that economic improvement eventually will reduce migration.

According to the literature, most migrants' families invest their remittances primarily in improving their housing and, to a lesser extent, in productive investments. For the nine major sending states, we found that migratory intensity is associated with improved provision of services for housing and a greater use of

B I N A T I O N A L S T U D Y

E S T U D I O B I N A C I O N A L

modern agricultural technology. These are probably the most important effects stemming from remittances we found.

Remittances also enable many communities to overcome capital constraints and to finance public works projects, such as parks, churches, schools, electrification, road construction, and sewers. The impacts and changes reported at the community level are generally in keeping with findings reported in other parts of the world. Our interpretation coincides with others who view remittances as a

vehicle for furthering the development of migrant areas. The benefits increase as long as the channeling of remittances goes hand-in-hand with other conditions, such as the concentration of private and public resources in the same areas, notably on infrastructure.

Possible Productivity Gains from United States Work

Experience. There is some evidence that working experience in the United States may produce additional benefits to migrants when they return to Mexico. Such a bonus would be realized as improved earnings (Greenwood & Tienda 1997), if they are able to capitalize on their experience acquired.

It is estimated that 7.0 to 7.3 million Mexicans were residents in the United States in 1996.¹ Although a small figure in comparison with the total Mexican population, this represents more than 7.9 percent of the population from Mexican sending states. Most of this loss involves persons in their working ages.

Projections for the major sending states suggest slowing population growth in the next century. Assuming current rates of migration, growth rates would fall from 2.1 percent today to 0.6 percent in 2010. Assuming no migration, growth rates would fall from what would otherwise be 3.1 percent today to 1.4 percent in 2010. In these states, the loss of population due to past and ongoing outmigration is projected to reduce the potential growth of the working age population by

46 percent.

Costs of Migration for Mexico. The loss of human capital is the most important cost to Mexico. These costs have commonly been estimated to be small by assuming an excess of redundant labor in the developing sending country. However, for Mexico this assumption is questionable because of the

Demographic

Impacts

Social

Effects

MEXICOESTADOS UNIDOS SOBRE MIGRACION

MIGRATION BETWEEN MEXICO & THE UNITED STATES

selectivity or characteristics of its migrants. Family and community costs have only recently received attention.

The loss of human capital could be estimated by looking at the costs of education, health, and social infrastructure incurred throughout the life of individuals to achieve an economically active person in good working conditions. The cost for Mexico in human capital is the "opportunity cost" represented by having invested in preparing that person and having foregone the value added of the migrant's productive economic activity. The net returns on Mexico's investments in that person are those remittances or savings sent or brought to the country.

There are relative costs or returns. By return we understand the quotient between what is obtained as a wage or added value and what is invested or spent in exchange for that product. For Mexico as a country, the return is small if we consider the quotient between the amount saved from the wage paid to migrants and the costs of education, health, etc., incurred. The return on migrants is only in relation to the net amount in remittances or savings, as approximately

90 percent of what they receive in the United States is consumed there. In this regard, it is incorrect to associate the total U.S. wage with Mexican earnings.

Family and Community Costs. Migration is accompanied by significant changes in family organization, such as a necessary additional work effort by families to compensate for the migration of one or several of their members. Similarly, in the communities with the greatest migration, major changes occur in those communities' social and political organizations, which frequently make themselves felt in adverse ways. It is common for the young people with the most initiative to leave, with the result that communities lose their current and potential leaders as well have a weakened capacity for interaction with the

exterior. The actual or potential loss of labor to migration may push up wages and create uncertainties that discourage investment and training of workers in places of high out-migration. It is also common for migration to be accompanied by serious problems of family disintegration, as well as by different psychological and social problems that previously were nonexistant in the communities of origin. Although such social costs are difficult to estimate accurately, observers realize their great importance in the communities of out-migration. Systematic research would be invaluable.

B I N A T I O N A L S T U D Y

E S T U D I O B I N A C I O N A L

The impacts of Mexican migration in the United States today may differ from those of the past because of changed economic and sociopolitical circumstances. There is extensive evidence that since the mid-1970s the earnings and employment of more educated workers have been improving relative to the less-skilled. This may translate into more limited economic mobility for today's migrants which, coupled with reductions in welfare and health benefits, increases the challenges of integration and adaptation.

These conditions fuel perceptions that the costs of migration exceed the benefits. Much evidence refutes this viewwith the qualification that not all segments of society share equally in the benefits or bear equally the costs. To capture this distributional nature of impacts, we distinguish national, regional, and local impacts. We also separate economic, demographic, sociocultural, and political consequences, although these dimensions are interrelated.

Our major observation is that the failure to recognize distributional issues is an important source of misunderstanding about the benefits and costs of migration in general and of Mexican migration in particular.

· Therefore, we take as our point of departure the simple premise that Mexican migration produces economic benefits for the United States, but that these benefits come at a cost for some. Our main task then is to identify the particular benefits and costs of Mexican migration, and to specify which groups gain and which lose.

Such a balanced and nuanced portrait of impacts is crucially important for contemplating policy strategies. Simply stated, most impacts of Mexican migration will be more pronounced in locales and industries where migrants reside and work. However, short- and long-term impacts differ, some impacts are transmitted intergenerationally, and many benefits and costs cannot be quantified.

Most researchers report that industry case studies uncover evidence of competitive effects of migrants. Most national-level analyses, however, typically find that the wage and employment effects of increased migration on native-born groups are not great; rather, the largest impacts are on other foreign-born

workers (like the migrants themselves).² To evaluate these generalities, we

reviewed all of the most recent empirical literature and performed a new econometric analysis.

THE

UNITED

STATES &

MIGRATION

EFFECTS

Economic

Effects

MEXICOESTADOS UNIDOS SOBRE MIGRACION

MIGRATION BETWEEN MEXICO & THE UNITED STATES

Industry Case Studies. Employment displacement effects of

migrant workers are evident in certain industries in regions, such as Los Angeles and New York, where migrants are concentrated. These may occur because the ready supply of migrant workers places downward pressure on industry wage rates. Alternatively, the displacement may occur because employers "prefer" or find it advantageous to hire new migrants even when natives are available at comparable wages. A shortcoming of most case studies is that they do not trace the ultimate outcomes for native workers who presumably find new jobs, but sometimes at a considerable cost.

The favorable aspects of these effects accrue most clearly to the migrant worker and to foreign and native-business owners. It is often observed that immigrants are highly entrepreneurial and that foreign-owned businesses contribute to the U.S.'s legendary job-creating, small business sector. Some Mexican migrant worker networks have positive effects for small and large foreign- and native-owned businesses. In many such businesses, migrant workers and employers appear to strike a bargain that benefits both: in exchange for lower starting wages, the migrant gains informal job training from the employer. The efficiency and speed with which networks operate gives employers ready access to a pool of workers vouched for by the employers' current workers. These hiring

networks reduce search costs, reduce the likelihood of "problem workers," and provide redundancy during times of peak production or when employees are out sick.³

Impacts on Business and Workers Nationally and

Regionally. Because they are so specific, it is difficult to generalize from case studies. Therefore, we undertook a statistical analysis of 122 metropolitan areas using the 1990 census. We introduced several analyses that permit us to unbundle effects to regions and metropolitan areas. The results of these econometric excercises are discussed below.

The primary beneficiaries of migration are, of course, the Mexican-born migrant workers. As discussed earlier in this chapter, migrants and their families consider the opportunity cost of migration; they balance the costs and benefits of working in the United States against their opportunities if they remain in Mexico. With a wage differential of at least five to one, the Mexican-born migrant working in the United States benefits from a higher standard of living.

B I N A T I O N A L S T U D Y

E S T U D I O B I N A C I O N A L

Owners of capital, that is business owners and investors, are clear winners. We measure the effect of Mexican-born migrants on the "real rental price of capital." For example, a positive migrant effect means that an owner of a machine shop is able to charge a higher amount for a tractor or water pump rental. In California's metropolitan areas a 20 percent increase in Mexican-born migrants increases the return to capital by 0.8 percent on average. Agricultural areas benefit more, Merced and Salinas by 1.7 percent each and Visalia-Tulare by 1.4 percent. For Texas, a 20 percent increase in migrants is associated with a 0.3 percent increased return to capital on average. But the returns to border areas are greater: Brownsville 1.4 percent, El Paso 1.6 percent, and McAllen-Endinburg-

Mission a 1.8 percent increase.

Shifting to the effects of Mexican-born migrants on the wages of other labor force groups, we find that the principal adverse impact is on already-resident migrants from Mexico or elsewhere. In our model, a simulated 20 percent increase in the number of foreign-born, low-skill Mexican workers lowered the average wage of this labor group by 3 percent, but left the wages of other labor categories almost unchanged. Next we simulated the direct wage impacts of Mexican-born labor, on average, for several metropolitan areas within a given region.

For the average United States region, even relatively large increases in Mexican-born labor have only relatively small impacts on native workers. Metropolitan areas in California and Texas have relatively heavy concentrations both of

Mexican-born persons and of native-born persons of Mexican ancestry. The major impact of a 20 percent increase in foreign-born, low-skill Mexican labor in California is on other foreign-born, low-skilled Mexicans. Their wages fall by 6.9 percent and their employment declines by 1.3 percent. Otherwise, there are only minimal impacts on other skill or immigrant groups. The results for Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado are similar to those for California, but for the most part are more moderate.

Empirical evidence appears to indicate that in areas where Mexican migrant concentrations are extremely high, such as along the southwestern border, wage depression and job displacement effects are evident. These impacts are strongest among less-skilled and already-resident Mexican male migrants. Areas of very high concentration of foreign-born, low-skill Mexican workers clearly experience the largest impacts. For thirteen metropolitan areas for which this labor group constitutes 60 percent or more of the foreign-born population, a 20 percent increase

MEXICOESTADOS UNIDOS SOBRE MIGRACION

MIGRATION BETWEEN MEXICO & THE UNITED STATES

in this group results in wage decline among this same group of 11.4 percent. Employment of the group is reduced by 2.4 percent. Native, low-skill females of Mexican ancestry experience a 1.3 percent wage decline and a 0.4 percent job displacement effect.⁴

Economic Adaptation and Social Mobility. Social integration depends among other things on economic advancement. One quite optimistic analysis favorably compares wage growth for first, second, and third generation Mexican-origin men with that of native whites and blacks.⁵ The findings show improvements, especially by the third generation, in both educational

attainment and economic mobility. Nevertheless, the educational attainment of Mexican-origin men remains the lowest of any ethnoracial group. Our above-cited research and a study in Los Angeles, suggest that the wages of Mexican-origin men are dragged down by the combination of the group's low educational levels and competition with others with very low educational levels. These disadvantages are likely to persist and possibly increase if the volume of

unskilled, and especially unauthorized, migration from Mexico continues.⁶

Enclaves and Entrepreneurial Activity. Mexican-owned businesses exist throughout the southwest and are making a strong showing in southern California. Research is finding successful Mexican enclaves in, for example, Los Angeles fruit markets. In Chicago, our work on "The Little Village Study" shows that dense settlement patterns (economies of scale) are conducive to the emergence of informal, and ultimately, formal, economic activity that caters to the needs of other coethnics. Evidently, economies of scale can have both offsetting and positive effects (Rosenthal & Tienda 1997). Clearly, more research is needed to address the positive attributes of Mexican entrepreneurs and consumers.

Presumably motivated by the belief that legal and unauthorized immigrants participate "too much" in public assistance programs, Congress passed provisions related to immigrants as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. This Act restricts the access of even legal immigrants to welfare. Accordingly, we performed analyses of the public assistance utilization of Mexican-born households.

Welfare Participation. The empirical results indicate that Mexican-born households are no more likely to use welfare than either otherwise

Welfare Participation & Fiscal Costs

B I N A T I O N A L S T U D Y

E S T U D I O B I N A C I O N A L

comparable native-born households of Mexican ancestry or otherwise comparable native-born households in general. They are, however, more likely to participate than native whites, but less likely than native blacks. Moreover, recent cohorts from Mexico are less likely to use welfare than otherwise similar groups, whereas earlier cohorts are more likely users (Davies & Greenwood 1997).

There is a general consensus that relatively young and recently arrived Mexican-born migrants are not more prone to use public assistance than natives of similar socioeconomic characteristics. Yet, migrants' characteristics determine their eligibility for welfare and, to a large extent, their propensity to apply for means-tested income transfers.⁷

Unauthorized Migrants and Fiscal Costs. Most studies agree that immigrants, and especially unauthorized migrants, impose a fiscal burden on state and local governments, but there is considerable disagreement about the magnitude of this burden. In recent years, states have brought suit against the U.S. federal government to recover the costs of providing services to unauthorized migrants. At the national level, however, there is less consensus on costs that may not be fully resolved for several technical reasons. Despite the limits of fiscal impact studies, we prepared a secondary analysis of unauthorized migrants for California, Texas, and Illinois as an illustration.

Our calculations, using a best estimate of the unauthorized alien population, show that unauthorized migrants in California use $1,124 of state and local services per capita, which is higher than the $906 per capita used by the rest of the population. Public school expenses account for about two-thirds of these costs. In Texas, the unauthorized and the rest of the population both use somewhat more than $1,000 per capita in services. School costs account for more than 80 percent of these costs. In Illinois, unauthorized migrants use less state and local resources than the rest of the state population because of a comparatively older and smaller school population. The unauthorized in Illinois use relatively little in the way of state and local services.

California's total net fiscal burden of the unauthorized is the heaviest ($829 million) of all states, Texas's is much smaller ($194 million), and Illinois's is almost trivial ($17 million) relative to the state budget. These net figures are smaller than the states' estimates used in claims against the federal government because the states' costs (but not revenues) are based on figures for the unauthorized population that seem to be too high.⁸

MEXICOESTADOS UNIDOS SOBRE MIGRACION

MIGRATION BETWEEN MEXICO & THE UNITED STATES

There is no disagreement that California bears the brunt of immigration, including unauthorized migration. The fiscal impact of the state's many migrants is magnified by a relatively large per capita fiscal gap between the unauthorized and the rest of the population. This gap results from the higher rate and more progressive nature of the tax system in California, which leaves the unauthorized paying a smaller share of the total state and local tax burden.

A final caveat to these studies is that the fiscal impacts of migration that should concern us occur over the life span of migrants. In all static models to date, education is a cost. Yet, education is fundamentally an investment in future skills and earnings and we can reasonably expect that its current cost will be recovered in future greater productivity, especially if children complete school and become taxpayers. This expectation is born out by recent work by an expert National Research Council [NRC] (1997) panel.

Contribution to Population Growth. Recent trends in immigration have left an indelible demographic imprint. From 1970 to 1990, total international migration accounted for 25 to 33 percent of net annual population increase. However, Mexican migration itself is only part of total immigration and contributed less (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996). During the 1960s and 1970s, approximately 14 percent of all legal immigrants admitted were from Mexico. This share rose to 23 percent during the late 1980s owing to the impact of the legalization program. In FYs 1995 and 1996, Mexican-born immigrants were 12 and 18 percent respectively of total U.S. immigration.

Although Mexican migration has been a relatively small component of net aggregate population growth, its impact on the size of the Mexican-origin population is far more substantial. Migration was responsible for less than one-half (and substantially less for legal immigrants) of the growth of the Mexican-origin population between 1970 and 1980. At the latter date, only one in four persons of Mexican origin were foreign-born. By 1990, and in the wake of both the large volume of IRCA legalizations and continued migration from Mexico, more than one in three persons of Mexican origin were foreign-born (Greenwood & Tienda 1997).

Secondary (or indirect) demographic impacts derive from the fertility of native- and foreign-born women of Mexican origin. In 1990, the average number of children ever born to Mexican origin women aged 25 to 34 were 1.7 and 2.1 for

Demographic Impacts

B I N A T I O N A L S T U D Y

E S T U D I O B I N A C I O N A L

the native and foreign-born, respectively. Among women aged 35 to 44, the nativity differentials in children ever born were greater still, 2.5 for U.S.-born women compared to 3.3 for Mexican-born women. Current and future demographic impacts, particularly those associated with the school-aged population and future workforce entrants, will be most pronounced in localities where Mexican migrants are concentrated. Female predomination in recent cohorts (with the exception of the IRCA legalizations) has implications for the future demographic impacts of Mexican migration. For example, the median age of legal female Mexican immigrants in 1995 was 25, the peak of women's reproductive years.¹²

Population Projections. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that the U.S. population will increase by 50 percent between 1995 and 2050, from

263 million to 394 million (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996, 1997). Declining overall fertility and increased longevity mean that immigration will be a larger component of future growth. These projections do not separately identify immigrants, but we know that Mexicans comprise slightly more than 60 percent of all Hispanics, a share relatively stable since the early 1970s (Bean & Tienda 1987:Table 2.2). According to the Census Bureau's projections, the Hispanic population will contribute 37 percent of growth from 1995-2000, 44 percent from 2000-2020, and 62 percent thereafter. As a result, the absolute and relative sizes of Asian and Hispanic populations will more than double (rising from 5

to 8 percent of the total population for Asians and from 10 to 26 percent for Hispanics).¹³

A National Research Council panel (1997:26) made independent projections. The panel first estimated how large today's population would be in the absence of immigration since 1950. They concluded the U.S. population would have been 14 percent smaller than its 1995 size and would have been considerably older. Projecting forward current levels of immigration for fifty to fifty-five years would increase population by 80 million above what would occur without any immigration. This net increase reflects the direct result of 45 million new immigrants plus the dual indirect effects of higher immigrant fertility and a more youthful first- and second-generation immigrant population. As the single largest national origin group in recent years, Mexicans would account for approximately 10 - 12 percent of the increase at the base year, compounded by their higher fertility and young age structure.

Two important compositional changes follow from the current level and country of origin composition of immigrant streams. First, current immigration levels

MEXICOESTADOS UNIDOS SOBRE MIGRACION

MIGRATION BETWEEN MEXICO & THE UNITED STATES

will increase future enrollments in primary, secondary, and college enrollments relative to lower immigration levels. Second, the race and ethnic composition of the United States population will change substantially with especially large proportions of Asians and Hispanics.

Social Relations and Status. In our study of social impacts, we address social status and the place of the Mexican-origin community relative to other ethnic and racial groups. It appears that Mexican migrants occupy some kind of intermediate social position between native whites and native blacks. Surveys indicate, for example, that all groups, including blacks, rate whites as the most desirable neighbors, blacks as the least desirable, and Hispanics in between. Whites in Los Angeles have been observed to be more opposed to housing integration with blacks than with Hispanics (in Los Angeles, Hispanics are

almost entirely of Mexican origin). Other groups, such as Asians, seem to share the same preference for Mexicans over blacks as neighbors.

Let us be clear: Mexican immigrants do not occupy an intermediate social position because they are somehow middle class. On the contrary, that their social position seems higher than their relative socioeconomic status raises interesting questions about the significance of race and national origin, and suggests that Mexicans play a "buffer" role in the U.S. stratification system. And, the positive view of immigrants as neighbors may be explained, in part, by their role in revitalizing communities.¹¹

Migrants and Crime. Relatively little research addresses the association between crime and migration. According to the 1991 Survey of State Prisons, Mexicans account for nearly half of the foreign born in state prisons. However, their overrepresentation may reflect differences in treatment through the criminal justice system. Migrants along the border are more likely to be arrested, detained prior to trial, convicted, and incarcerated (two to four times more likely) as citizens.¹² Unauthorized migrants also are less likely to be released from jail prior to trial.¹³

Voting and Political Impacts. Their neighborhood-building role in the inner city accords well with the reality or myth of the hardworking migrant, striving to get ahead. Survey work has shown that very few Mexican

Social & Political Impacts

B I N A T I O N A L S T U D Y

E S T U D I O B I N A C I O N A L

Americans believe that they have been victimized by racism or discrimination. Mexican Americans seem eager to embrace a meritocratic vision of American society. While Mexican Americans in the U.S. Congress tend to find common ground with black congressional leadersboth groups are predominantly Democratic, mostly urban, and largely progressive on fiscal issueson the local level such black-Mexican coalitions have proved much harder to create or sustain.

The various political impacts of Mexican migration are felt primarily in

Mexican-American communities. That most Mexican migrants cannot vote seems to imply that no direct impact exists. Yet, the foreign-born affect electoral politics through census enumerations and decennial redistricting (congressional and state districts are based on all persons, not only adult citizens). Thus, Mexican-American districts have many fewer voters; in the 1992 United States elections, Mexican Americans cast only about 16 votes per hundred persons compared to 50 per hundred for non-Hispanic whites. While Mexican-born migrants increase the population base that creates Mexican-American districts, their disinterest in electoral politics, some argue, may dilute the natural bonds between elected officials and adult citizens.¹⁴

The Mexican-American community has increased its power in electoral politics since 1970 and the political impacts of Mexican migrationmediated through their relationship with Mexican-American communitiesmay have indirect

effects on elections and legislation. In presidential politics, their concentration in California, Texas, and Illinois could give Mexican-American voters leverage, but only if the state in question were very closely contested. While Mexican-

American voters have generally favored Democratic presidential candidates in proportions almost high enough to qualify as "bloc voting," their low turnout and fundraising potential means that national candidates have been likely to view them as marginal players. It remains to be seen whether or not the recent surge in the naturalization of Mexican-born adults, coupled with a political climate that might well cause new citizens concern, will affect these dynamics.

MEXICOESTADOS UNIDOS SOBRE MIGRACION

MIGRATION BETWEEN MEXICO & THE UNITED STATES

Border

relations

Many of the impacts of Mexico to U.S. migration are experienced at the border itself and thus affect both countries.

Border communities are binational entities, with many residents on each side of the border having strong family, commercial and social connections to those on the other side. The volume of movements both ways across the long Mexican-United States border is substantial. The vast majority of border crossers go for short visits, often purchasing goods on the other side of the border. The contributions to local economies emanating from this cross-border commerce are also substantial.

The border relationship is not without its tensions, however. Cross-border petty crime, vandalism, and vice is a continuing source of concern in many border communities. Border cities complain about the fiscal impact when residents of the other country access such public services as health care and education. The growth of poor, unincorporated areas that straddle the border presents challenges to public health and the environment. For the most part, however, the neighboring states, cities and townships have found it mutually beneficial to resolve tensions before they disrupt the important ties that bind the communities.

Violence en route to and at the border are among the most negative effects of migration between the two countries, largely but not exclusively related to the unauthorized movements. Migrants are victims of a variety of crimes, from attacks and abandonment by smugglers to theft, rape and even murder. Recorded and unrecorded deaths associated with attempted border crossings are of concern. So, too, are violent attacks by smugglers and others on officials who are responsible for border operations in both countries.

Incidents of human rights abuses by federal, state, and local officials have been recorded as well. A well-publicized incident in Riverside, California, when local police were videotaped beating migrants after a high speed chase, highlighted the potential for such abuses. Both governments have taken action to curb the abuse of migrants by both private and official auspices on both sides of the border. Grupo Beta, for example, is a Mexican police unit charged with protecting

migrants at the border itself. The recurrent allegations of abuse have led to the establishment of a number of monitoring groups, as well, including the Border Liaison Mechanism.

Cross-Border Commerce & Social Relations

Human

Rights Violations

B I N A T I O N A L S T U D Y

E S T U D I O B I N A C I O N A L

¹ According to U.S. data, 85 percent of Mexican-born persons are between 15 and 64 years of age; only 4.6 percent are 65 years and older (CPS 1995).

² The research literature repeatedly finds that migrants have only small national-level impacts on U.S. workers. Three reasons have been suggested: migrants are a small fraction of the labor force; offsetting effects occur in labor demand and supply relationships; and efficient U.S. markets may arbitrage the effects across the nation, making them difficult to detect. The first two reasons are most plausible. A large body of research on regional adjustments suggests that effects would not necessarily be rapidly "arbitraged" and large, direct impacts of new arrivals should be measurable.

³ It is true that new migrants often work at lower than average wages that, in theory, reduce production costs for employers. However, this occurs mainly in labor-intensive, competitive industries with typically low-productivity and low-profit margins overall.

⁴ The sectoral distribution of migrant labor ultimately determines the impact of migration on the wage rates of domestic unskilled labor. That dramatic differences exist in the regional concentration of migrants and in the interindustry distribution of migrants implies distinct effects across regions. Because of their sources and border entry points, unauthorized migrants may be even more concentrated than the legal migrants, and their impacts will be concentrated accordingly.

⁵ Mexican migrants are disadvantaged relative to native blacks in terms of educational and language skills, yet in most states they have higher rates of labor force participation and lower unemployment rates. That the most economically and socially disadvantaged groups are not immigrants, but rather African-American, Native-American and Puerto Rican, suggests that Mexican migrants have a reasonable chance of adapting to U.S. labor market and society. This research also finds that the intergenerational changes in the wage structure take longer to play out for Mexicans than for other white migrant workers.

⁶ This research effort also suggests that wage penalties for lack of fluency in English may have increased during the 1980s when returns to skills rose appreciably. This bodes ill for the pace of integration of Mexican migrants in the future (Trejo 1997). Exposure to other immigrants, not generational status, is the most powerful predictor of language maintenance. The forces for retaining Spanish in public and private settings is particularly high for Mexicans, not only because of the volume and concentration of recent flows, but also because Mexican Americans are less likely to migrate internally and more likely to reside in multigenerational households that include one or more foreign-born persons.

⁷ For instance, Mexican migrants to the United States are characterized by low levels of educational attainment, large families, and poor English-language abilities. All these factors, among others, are generally found to be positively related with the level of welfare use.

⁸ Considering that careful estimates of the unauthorized migrant population vary by as much as 15 percent or more, caution is necessary in drawing conclusions about state level fiscal impacts. The largest cost is of unauthorized migrants is primary and secondary education. In our "best estimate" only children who are foreign-born and unauthorized are counted. In our "citizen children" estimate we include the citizen children of unauthorized migrants. This change raises the unauthorized population by only 5 percent, but the unauthorized school-age population rises by 25 percent. In California, this increases the total cost of services by 18 percent and the net fiscal burden from $829 million to $1.08 billion. In our "states' estimate" we use the states' own estimates of the unauthorized population, which is considerably higher than the Census Bureau's high-end estimate for 1992. This increases California's unauthorized population by almost 50 percent. Nevertheless, both the "citizen children" and "states' estimate" yield similar aggregate fiscal impacts.

Endnotes

MEXICOESTADOS UNIDOS SOBRE MIGRACION

MIGRATION BETWEEN MEXICO & THE UNITED STATES

⁹ The larger completed family sizes of Mexican immigrant women result from childbearing after migrating to the United States rather than initially entering the United States with larger families. This is contrary to predictions based on assimilation theory and differs from the fertility behavior of other immigrant women.

¹⁰ The growth of the Mexican-origin population is likely to increase far more than the other Hispanic origin groups for several reasons. Mexicans are the largest source country of current immigration. Fertility of both native and foreign-born Mexican-origin women will likely contribute to relatively faster population growth. The 1995 Mexican-origin population is larger and relatively younger than other Hispanic origin groups, providing a bigger base from which to compound future indirect effects. Finally, Mexicans have been and are likely to remain the largest source of unauthorized migration.

¹¹ Research in Chicago's "Little Village" reveals that Mexican migration either contributes to community revitalization or prevents decaying inner city neighborhoods from becoming underclass neighborhoods. From 1970 to 1990, Chicago experienced a tremendous polarization in neighborhoods inhabited by natives. By 1990, most of the neighborhoods that in 1970 were working class and stable middle class neighborhoods had either gentrified or been absorbed into black ghettos and abandoned by all but the poorest residents. The parts of Chicago in which working-class neighborhoods have grown or even been maintained are those areas settled by migrantsprimarily Mexicans.

¹² Gross differences in the incarceration rates of Mexican and U.S. citizens disappear once differences in age structure (because Mexicans are younger and petty crime rates are higher among the young) and especially the differences in treatment in the criminal justice system of Mexicans and Anglos are taken into account (Hagan and Palloni 1996).

¹³ Incorrect perceptions about criminality, nevertheless, contribute to what appears to be public misperceptions about immigrants generally. Especially during times of high unemployment and job competition, i.e., the changed climate of California in the late 1980s, public opinion is for reduced immigration. Surveys in 1995 found that Mexican-born migrants were the least preferred of any immigrant group. Several polls conducted during the 1990s found that respondents believed that two-thirds of migrants to the United States were unauthorized, an obvious impossibility, but partly an outcome of public leadership and discourse that continually blurs the line between illegal and legal immigrants.

¹⁴ In turn, Mexican Americans seem to be ambivalent about new migrants from Mexico and, at times, at odds with the views of their leadership. Various surveys have found that Mexican Americans view unauthorized migration in particular very unfavorably. Perhaps this is associated with various election-day polls that found that as many as 30 percent of Mexican Americans voted for California's 1994 "Proposition 187," arguably one of the most egregious pieces of anti-

immigrant legislation in the post-Civil Rights era.