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Report and Agenda

Managing Migration in the 21st Century
Comparative Immigration and Integration Program
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
Winter Workshop
University of California, San Diego
Friday-Saturday October 9-10, 1998
Philip Martin
October 15, 1998

Recent Developments in US and Germany 2

Integration of Immigrants 4

Labor Migration in Asia 6

Non-Migration, Transportation, Policy 8Smuggling: Policies 8

Smuggling: Research 9

Agenda 10

The 12th conference of the UC Comparative Immigration and Integration Program was held at UCD on October 9-10, 1998 in conjunction with the fifth meeting of the Managing Migration in the 21st Century program, which promotes comparative analysis of the migration patterns and integration policy issues in industrial democracies. An agenda and list of participants is attached. This report was not reviewed by speakers and participants.

The next workshop of the University of California Comparative Immigration and Integration Research Program will be held on Friday-Saturday, February 19-20, 1999 at the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UCSD; the fall 1999 meeting is tentatively planned for October 8-9, 1999 in northern CA. The February 1999 workshop will focus on two topics: (1) the political rights and participation of migrants in sending and receiving countries, including the extension of Mexican nationality and voting rights in Mexican elections to Mexican immigrants who have become U.S. citizens, obstacles to political participation among Latino and Asian immigrants in the US, political alliance-building between immigrants of different nationalities, and the involvement of U.S.-based immigrants in home-country political activities; and (2) controversies surrounding the economic mobility and sociocultural integration of second-generation immigrants (past, present, and future).

UC faculty and graduate students who expect to have papers relating to the politics rights and participation of migrants ready for presentation by February 19 should contact Wayne Cornelius ( Those wishing to present on second-generation mobility/integration issues should contact Roger Waldinger ( All paper proposals must be received by December 1, 1998. If you would like to be a discussant, or to be a participant in the work shop, please send an email to Philip Martin (

You are receiving this report because you participated in a past CIIP work shop. We are compiling an email list of persons interested in (1) being notified of CIIP seminars and being invited to participate, as speaker, discussant, or participant and (2) receiving these reports of CIIP seminars. If you wish to be added to the CIIP list, or you do NOT wish to remain on the CIIP list, please send a message to

Recent Developments in US and Germany
In 1996, the US enacted three major immigration laws: Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. Bob Bach noted that, as the US implements these far-reaching laws, it confronts the trade off between openness and control in the economy and labor market, in the provision of a social safety net for US residents, and in dealing with the side-effects of immigration policies abroad.
Economy/Labor Market. Section 110 of the IIRIRA, for example, requires the INS to develop a system for recording entries and exits by October 1, 1998, under the theory that entry and exit records will help the INS to more easily identify and remove overstayers, who are about 45 percent of the estimated six million unauthorized foreigners in the US in Fall 1998. However, entry and exit controls at US land borders are likely to lead to very long delays, unless the number of inspectors is increased dramatically. The Congress has decided to delay the start date of mandatory entry and exit controls until October 1, 2000.

Similarly, US high tech employers want the number of six-year visas available to foreigners who can work in the US as nonimmigrants to be increased from the current maximum 65,000 a year. The Clinton Administration wants to link any increase in the quota to (1) more protections for US workers and (2) a new $500 employer-paid fee that would provide funds to train US workers to fill high-tech and health care jobs for which employers are requesting foreigners. The compromise offered a few more protections and a $500 fee, but the agreement to increase the number of H-1B visas by 142,500 over the next three years died in the Senate in the rush to adjourn.

The training fee was an effort to train US workers and limit future labor shortages. In the over foreign farm workers, on the other hand, the debate was a rerun that included few suggestions of long-run thinking. Farmers want to modify the H-2A program that admits temporary farm workers in a manner that will lower worker protections and eliminate the need to provide housing for temporary farm workers, while worker advocates want to preserve or increase existing protections for H-2A foreign farm workers. Bach also noted that the US was considering the development of a visa that would permit foreign victims of exploitation and crimes in the US to remain.

Safety Net/Taxes. The US expects immigrants to enter and work, and to avoid resources to tax-paid benefit programs. There was widespread recognition that Congress went too far in 1996 in making legal immigrants ineligible for federal safety net programs, and some of the restrictions on legal immigrant access to welfare programs were relaxed in 1997-98. However, the INS is struggling with questions as new safety net programs are developed, especially programs that provide free or subsidized health care for children in working poor families.

The intent is to ensure that children in such families receive health care, but some immigrant parents do not enroll their children for fear that receiving tax-supported health care benefits may later jeopardize the family's access to immigration benefits, including naturalization and efforts to sponsor the admission of family members.

Foreign Policy. The US in a very uneven manner provided temporary protected status and later immigrant status to persons from the Caribbean and Central America who arrived in the 1980s and early 1990s. The fact that Congress approved a hierarchy of benefits--Cubans and Nicaraguans on top, Salvadorans and Guatemalans in the middle, and no benefits for Haitians and Hondurans--led to extensive commentary on the "unfairness" and "racism" of US policies.

Another issue of concern to emigration countries is the return of criminals from the US. Most non-US citizens convicted of aggravated felonies in the US must under 1996 laws be deported to their countries of origin, where the police are in many cases outgunned by criminals who learned or polished their trade in the US.

The third foreign policy issue linked to immigration is smuggling and terrorism. Security experts are concerned that as biochemical and nuclear weapons become more portable, the infrastructure developed to move economic migrants and asylum seekers over borders could also be used to smuggle weapons.

Bill Hing attacked Congress and President Clinton for approving the 1996 legislation that restricted the rights of immigrants, especially the eligibility of non-US citizens--especially tax-paying legal immigrants--to receive welfare assistance. Hing argues that immigrants make significant economic contributions to the US, and that their access to tax-funded services is restricted only when it is politically convenient to do so. He charges that racism--against Asians and Latinos--undergirds the restrictions on immigrant rights.

Hing believes that immigrants should be seen as dreamers, foreigners entering the US to achieve economic advancement that enriches both the foreigners and US residents. Instead, some recent US immigration legislation embodies a line in a Supreme Court decision, which likened immigrants to "toxic waste dumps," i.e. threats to Americans.

Kay Hailbronner noted that Germany had a change of government after elections on September 27, 1998. The new government will be a "red-green" coalition of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Greens, led by Gerhard Schroeder. On the day after the election, Schroeder said that Germany's immigration law will change: "We will make it possible to have dual citizenship."

While both the SPD and the Greens want a new immigration law, there is a clear difference between the purposes of such a law. The SPD seems to consider a new law in terms that will increase control over immigration--there may be an annual quota, but it would simply put existing flows into the new law, not permit more immigration as long as unemployment remains over 10 percent. The Greens, on the other hand, think of a new immigration law as opening new channels for new immigrants, with the annual quota tied to the 220,000 annual quota on ethnic Germans from the ex-USSR who arrive in Germany as German citizens. The FDP will likely support the SPD-Greens to develop a new immigration law that explicitly permits dual citizenship.

Hailbronner expects the real import of a new immigration law will be that the phrase "Germany is not a country of immigration" will fade away, as Germany comes to accept that it will continue to receive immigrants. Hailbronner also expects more immigration decisions to be made by the EU, which has acquired new powers to influence national immigration and asylum policies under the Amsterdam Treaty, and membership in the Schengen agreement--common external controls and freedom of movement within--will be mandatory for new EU members, with an opt out only for the UK, Ireland, and Denmark.

The EU and individual countries are searching for objective criteria to guide the return of foreigners with a TPS in their countries. The EU is also seeking to improve the operation of the Dublin agreement on asylum seekers, under which foreigners seeking asylum are required to submit their application in the first safe country they reach, and that decision is binding on all other EU nations. In order to enforce this one-bite approach, the EU is developing a system to fingerprint all asylum seekers and illegal immigrants.

At the end of 1996, there were 7.3 million foreigners living in Germany, including 3.5 million who had been in Germany ten or more years. There are two paths to naturalization in Germany. Ethnic Germans arriving from the ex-USSR and some young foreigners who have lived and studied in Germany for eight or more years have a right to naturalize--there were about 306,000 naturalizations by right in each of 1995 and 1996. In cases of persons with a right to naturalize, the burden of proof is on the government to prove that the foreigner is not fit to be a naturalized German.

Discretionary naturalizations are normally granted to foreigners who have lived at least 15 years in Germany; these applicants must show that German citizenship would be "in the interest of the German state," and prove that they have given up their old citizenship. There were about 34,000 discretionary naturalizations in each of 1995 and 1996, i.e., only 10-11 percent of naturalizations are those earned with residence, language etc, as in the US.

Christine Kreuzer's analysis of naturalizations differentiated between para 85 (young foreigners in Germany at least eight years) and para 86 (15 year foreigners). There were 86,000 para 85-86 naturalizations in 1996, including 53 percent by Turks. A significant share of these naturalizations involved dual nationality--about 25 percent of those naturalizing in 1996 kept their old passports because e.g. Iran refused to permit them to give up their Iranian citizenship.

Reinhard Lohrmann noted that in France two new immigration laws went into force in 1998, one reaffirming birthright citizenship for persons born in France at age 18, and one that expedited entry and residence for retired foreigners, students, and professional workers. France, Italy, and Greece in 1997-98 had amnesties that permitted some illegal foreign residents to become legal residents, demonstrating that not all European countries are strictly in an increased control mode. About 75,000 unauthorized foreigners in France received legal status, an estimated 60,000 of 300,000 unauthorized foreigners in Italy had their status regularized, and Greece is regularizing the status of some of the 500,000 illegals--12 percent of the Greek labor force. About half of illegal foreigners in Greece are Albanians; many of the others are from Eastern Europe and Asia.

Integration of Immigrants
Susan Martin contrasted the major immigrant integration problem of the US and Europe: low wages and poverty in the US, and low labor force participation rates and high unemployment in Europe. The relatively flexible labor market of the US permits immigrants to get jobs, but many remain poor. More structured European labor markets make it harder for immigrants to get jobs, so many remain dependent on welfare or unemployment benefits.
Martin laid out five strategies to deal with immigrant unemployment in Europe and immigrant poverty in the US:

more language and skills training, especially that connected with work

reviewing labor market and business regulations to ensure that they do not make it hard for immigrants to enter the labor market and begin businesses

development and enforcement of anti-discrimination policies

consideration of changes in immigration policy to facilitate integration, e.g. if two earners are needed to achieve a higher income, expedite family unification.

efforts to promote community and small business development

US immigration has been averaging about one million per year over the past decade, and includes almost three million illegal aliens who gained legal status under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The major immigration-integration dilemma is that immigration and integration policies are moving in opposite directions--the number of needy immigrants has been increasing, while federal and state support for integration has been declining. The consensus in the US is that the level and characteristics of current immigrants generates a small but positive impact on US-born residents.

As the US considers an immigration policy for the 21st century, Susan Martin recommends that the US reverse the 1996 effort to draw a sharp line between legal immigrants and US citizens, as the welfare reform law did. Instead, she recommends sharpening the traditional line between unauthorized foreigners and legal immigrants/US citizens by e.g. improving the enforcement of employer sanctions to discourage illegal immigration. To speed up immigrant integration, she recommends more integration assistance, funded by the federal government, but with much more funding and involvement from the primary US beneficiaries of the current wave of immigrants in rural America, US employers. More US employers should follow the example of Marriott and others and provide English and civics classes at the work place to enable good workers to be promoted and to reduce costly turnover; these now trained workers are also able to apply for naturalization.

Friedrich Heckmann noted that many industrial democracies want to limit immigration and better integrate settled immigrants. However, effective integration is defined very differently, with the spectrum marked by the French republican assimilationist model at the one end, and the Dutch or British multicultural model at the other. Heckmann defined national modes of integration to include both general socio-economic policies and policies and institutions that aim to integrate immigrants, such as the establishment in Germany of foreigners commissioners.

Integration has four dimensions: structural integration (legal rights and economic position); cultural integration (culture); social integration (friends); and identificational integration (loyalty shift). Although it appears that European countries differ very much in their integration modes or policies, and that there are sharp differences between Europe and the US, Heckmann notes that the differences are not as large as thought. He emphasized that general integration modes such as schools affect the integration of both natives and immigrants, and that these general policies may have the most important effects on integrating immigrants.

There are differences between e.g. France and Germany. Germany sees naturalization as the end of the integration process, while France and the US see naturalization as an instrument for accelerating integration. France sees public schools as the major integration tool, stresses that those who accept French and French culture are considered French, and finds that many second and third generation foreigners consider themselves to be French. In Germany, by contrast, Germanness is linked to ethnicity, so that even those who speak German etc might be considered foreigners, leading to the "foreigners with a German passport" syndrome. Germany has developed special institutions and programs for foreigners, while France tends to stress general rather than foreigners-only programs.

Patrick Simon reported the results of a 1992 INED survey of 9000 foreign born residents and 2000 persons born in France of foreign-born parents. Survey participants were asked about their interactions with others of the same nationality and with French residents and, in a series of triangles that measured in-group, out-group, and mixed contacts, Simon showed that housing patterns are the single most important factor governing contacts with other groups. The general conclusion is that as earnings increase, housing patterns change, and interaction with other groups increases.

Ulf Haeussler reported on the case of a Muslim woman (a naturalized Afghani) who was rejected for a school teaching job in Baden-Wuerttemberg because she insisted on wearing a head scarf in the classroom; her application was rejected on the grounds that the head scarf violated religious neutrality, a principal thought to be "enshrouded" but not explicitly stated in the German constitution. Haeussler concludes that this decision was wrong: he believes that German law does not prohibit some public expression of religious beliefs by government employees, as exemplified by nuns who wear habits while teaching in German public schools (except in Hesse).

Jan Rath reported that 600,000 or four percent of the 16 million residents of the Netherlands are Muslims, although many "Muslims" are non-practicing. Dutch society was until the 1960s strongly regimented along Catholic and Protestant lines, with schools, welfare and many other services delivered by religious-based organizations. Secularization increased with the evolution of the welfare state, and the diminished role of religious-based institutions was made formal in 1983 constitutional amendments. Today, acceptance of Muslims varies widely from city to city, with Rotterdam much more willing to accept Muslim schools and other institutions that Utrecht.

Roger Waldinger defined integration as the "equalization of life chances," and reminded the speakers who had used Milton Gordon's 1964 vision linear assimilation that Gordon was writing at a time of low US immigration, and at a time when giving up old identities for a new American identity was assumed to be a natural and inevitable process that reduced conflict between newcomers and established residents. Today, in a more segmented economy and society, Waldinger noted that more integration may mean more conflict, as newcomers realize that they do not have realistic chances to succeed.

Labor Migration in Asia
Ron Skeldon reminded everyone that migration has a long history within and from Asia, and that migration patterns have changed quickly, and could change quickly again. The financial crisis that began in 1997-98 is the equivalent of the US Depression from 1929-33, and is likely to have its most profound effects in internal migration patterns, much as the 1930s witnessed a stop to rural-urban migration, some urban-rural migration, and the migration of 1.3 million Dust Bowl farmers to California.
How will the financial crisis of 1997-98 affect international migration patterns? According to Skeldon, international migration may be less affected than internal migration, with the exception of fewer professional migrants and thus fewer maids etc to serve them. Indeed, efforts to repatriate foreign workers to open jobs for unemployed natives have been marked by repeated mis-matches, as exemplified by the failed effort to substitute Thais for foreigners to carry 100 kilogram sacks of rice into rice mills by reducing the bag weight to 50 kg. The apparent structural demand for foreign workers may increase illegal immigration and corruption.

Yasushi Iguchi, Japan' s SOPEMI correspondent, reported that Japan followed a policy of foreign direct investment in Asia to avoid the admission of unskilled foreign workers. However, FDI to avoid immigration soon reached its limits because of fears that the Japanese economy would be hollowed out.

Beginning in the late 1980s, Japan permitted and encouraged the return of some of the 1.6 million ethnic Japanese in Brazil and Peru. After the bubble economy burst, unemployment and foreign worker employment--including ethnic Japanese--increased simultaneously, and was 660,000 in 1997 (excluding long-term resident Koreans). Iguchi believes that brokers have played a key role in expanding the role of foreign workers in Japan, noting that one company was able to add a night shift of foreign workers and thus better utilize its expensive computer chip making equipment.

Wayne Cornelius compared the status of foreign-born workers in immigrant-dependent firms (those with 50 percent of more foreign-born workers) in San Diego with the roles of ethnic Japanese in Hamatsu. One important difference between the two groups of foreigners is that two-thirds of those in San Diego were settlers, intending permanent residents, while only 10 percent of those in Japan considered themselves permanent residents.

There were major differences in the relationship between personal or human capital characteristics and earnings--in Japan, employers did not ask Neikijen about their education, so college educated and those with less education did the same assembly line jobs for the same wages. Knowing Japanese can help a foreigner get a job, but seems to have little influence on wage mobility. Finally, if workers were brought to the firm by a labor broker, they are not likely to be promoted within the firm. In San Diego, by contrast, human capital characteristics do affect earnings--more education and knowledge of English can help foreign-born workers increase their earnings.

Kil-Sang Yoo's paper emphasized the Korea achieved an economic miracle between 1965 and 1996: GNP per capita rose from $105 to $10,500, or by 100 times. In the mid-1960s, two-thirds of Koreans were employed in agriculture and fisheries, and Korean development was based on drawing low-productivity out of agriculture into export-oriented manufacturing jobs.

Some workers went abroad, including 247 miners to Germany in 1963, followed by nurses to Germany in 1965, and some export-oriented construction. However, the real emigration boom occurred after the 1974-oil price hikes, when Korean companies won bids for jobs in oil-exporting nations. Such emigration peaked in the early 1980s.

Labor shortages grew more severe in Korea after 1988. There were in December 1997, before the current financial crisis, three major types of foreign workers in Korea:

16,000 professionals, admitted after Korean businesses demonstrate to government that Korean workers are not available

104,000 foreign trainees, admitted beginning in 1992 for small and medium-sized manufacturing industries, and after 1996 in construction and fisheries

148,000 illegal foreign workers, mostly persons who entered legally and overstayed visas

Even before the 1997 financial crisis, Korea was attempting to reduce illegal immigration. In October 1996, maximum fines for employing illegal workers were raised from 5 million to 10 million won, and maximum jail terms were increased from 1 to 3 years.

Between the fall of 1997 and fall 1998, unemployment in Korea increased from 2 to over 8 percent. To preserve jobs for Korean workers, the government offered an "amnesty" for illegal foreigners, permitting them to leave without paying 1 million won fines--about 53,000 left, leaving 95,000 illegals in June 1998. Similarly, about 50,000 trainees left, leaving 53, 000 in June 1998. Yoo believes that these data show that the Korean plan to use foreigners as a buffer worked--total foreigner employment fell 40 percent between the end of 1997 and summer 1998, from 268,000 to 160,000--but Yoo believes that Korea must abandon the fiction that trainees are not workers. If the foreign trainees were acknowledged to be workers, employers would have to pay them higher wages.

Non-Migration, Transportation, Policy
Thomas Straubhaar and Peter Fischer used the fact that only two percent of Swedes moved from one of 180 labor markets to another in 1994, and that two-thirds of the movers were 18-30 years of age, to explore immobility, or the micro advantages of not moving. They divided reasons for immobility into those affected with earning money, such as area or firm specific training, and those that affect the value of leisure (quality of life). In short, the analysis suggests that older employed persons with families who own homes are least likely to move--they value the benefits of being an experience "insider" where they live.
Drew Keeling explored the changes wrought by steamships replacing sailing ships to bring migrants across the Atlantic in the 19th century--steamships first increased the speed of the crossing, and later the size of the ships used. His major conclusion is that the initial effects of the British Inman Company's use of steamships with metal hulls and screw propellers was to speed up the trip, reducing it from five weeks to two weeks. Migrants in 1858 paid twice the fare to take steamships; the shorter crossing also limited their exposure to diseases that swept over sailing ships and killed many passengers.

As steamships got larger and faster, they encouraged many migrants to act as sojourners, coming to the US to work seasonally or for a year or two and then returning. Improved transportation, in other words, converted many migrant crossings from one-way to round trip.

Marc Rosenblum explored the determinants of US immigration policy, exploring the triangular relationships between Congress, the President, and foreign governments to determine major movements between more openness to more restrictions on immigration. By comparing the domestic and international salience of particular laws and events, Rosenblum was able to position particular events, putting e.g. the 1942 launch of the Bracero program in the high international and low domestic salience corner, and the 1986 IRCA in the low international and high domestic salience corner.

Smuggling: Policies
Susan Martin reported on one result of stepped up US border control operations: the expanded role of smugglers in bringing migrants over the Mexico-US border has increased. This has had three major effects on unauthorized migration patterns:
more document fraud. Migrants caught trying to enter with false documents now face expedited removal, with a bar on legal re-entry for five years.

more deaths in the desert as migrants attempt to go around beefed up border patrol positions.

more heterogeneous smuggling organizations, ranging from the community-based family friend and occasional smuggler to labor recruiters-smugglers to criminal organizations that also smuggle people.

Strategies for dealing with smuggling include law enforcement information compilation and exchange, breaking up smuggling routes and raiding safe houses, adding resources so that prosecutors treat smuggling as a serious offense, and increasing the penalties for smuggling--until recently the penalties for smuggling cigarettes were more severe than penalties for smuggling people.

Martin also noted that, unlike goods, people can be educated about the dangers and risks associated with smuggling, and thus deterred from attempting to be smuggled into another country. However, she noted the fine line between smuggling and asylum: some asylum seekers use smugglers to get to countries that offer protection, and it is often hard to separate out legitimate refugees from economic migrants when smugglers and migrants are discovered.

Kay Hailbronner reported that the Schengen agreement, now part of the EU, has produced side effects, such as the right of the German border police to conduct random identity checks in trains because of fears that Greece and Italy are not doing thorough enough checks on persons entering Schengenland. Germany has enormous resources devoted to immigration control: 20,000 agents, including 12,000 federal border police, 6000 customs inspectors, and 2000 state police on borders, mostly in Bavaria. Some 25,000 foreigners were apprehended on eastern borders in 1996, and one-third of those apprehended were being smuggled. Hailbronner stressed the need to better coordinate Schengen visa issuance and entry inspections, noting that German police discovered that 50 Iraqis on a train all had visas from the same Italian consulate.

Reinhard Lohrmann noted that International Organization for Migration has developed a three-way typology of traffickers-- amateur smugglers who tend to operate in border regions such as along Mexico-US border; criminals who specialize in one route such as via ferries between Calais and Dover; and criminal smuggling businesses that use many routes to move foreigners from China to the US. These smuggling businesses receive most of the estimated $5-7 billion per year in smuggling revenues world wide.

Given world wide inequalities and information about opportunities abroad, Lohrmann noted the potential for growth in smuggling. Risks are relatively low, with maximum prison terms of two to five years, versus penalties for drug smuggling or black market goods. The IOM has done surveys and studies to better understand smuggling, and engaged in educational campaigns so that e.g. young women are not "tricked" into being smuggled under the false pretense that they will be hostesses.

Smuggling: Research
David Kyle emphasized the heterogeneity of human smuggling-migrant trafficking, those involved range from persons who help economic migrants across a river to those who
enslave children for profit. In order to explain how some regional economies become based on the export of people, he uses the term "migration merchant" to refer to anyone who knowingly profits from voluntary illegal migration. Many legitimate businesses and corrupt government officials are involved in migrant trafficking. While there is some evidence of criminal organizations such as drug smuggling rings involved in this human trade, the high levels of trust needed by both trafficker and migrant preclude their easy entry into human smuggling. Voluntary migrant trafficking is built on much more sophisticated organizations than "informal social networks;" they do not necessarily take the form of full-blown criminal organizations, although such organizations may be involved as sub-contractors to provide specific services (e.g., forgery of documents, collection of payments).

David Spener reviewed smuggling in south Texas, emphasizing that stepped up US border controls in fact had the effects noted by Susan Martin, with new routes and better organized smugglers getting involved. However, Spener noted that relatively few resources were needed to get into the smuggling business: a recruiter who hangs out at the bus station in Mexican border cities, a house to assemble a group of migrants, a guide to get them across the border, safe houses in the US, and then vehicles to move the migrants past interior INS check points. Based on data from many sources, it appears that, in 1998 dollars, the cost of smuggling is about the same in 1998 as in 1988--$650 in 1988, and $600 in 1998, although smuggling costs were lowest in 1995, at $300. Thus, the hypothesis that higher smuggling fees following tighter border controls would lead to greater involvement of criminal organizations has no far not been borne out in south Texas.

Rich Friman provided a skeptical overview of illegal Chinese (Fujianese) in Japan, noting that it served Japanese police and maritime agency interests to exaggerate the extent and nature of the threat from uncontrolled Chinese immigration. However, the number of Chinese apprehended was 18 in 1990, and 1200 in 1997--even if these numbers reflect only 10 percent of total flows, this means that only 12,000 Chinese attempted to be smuggled into Japan in 1997. He noted that fears of a Chinese migrant invasion resonate with Japanese who believe that homogeneity is the source of social stability.

Friman emphasized that illegal Chinese immigration increased when:

Japan in the late 1980s cracked down on Japanese language schools that also permitted "students" to work part time

there were building booms, including reconstruction after the Kobe earthquake and preparations for the Nagano Olympics.

Rey Koslowski noted that human smuggling is a "natural" part of economic globalization, facilitated by improving global communications and transportation systems. Nation-state formation and globalization facilitate both migration and crime, so world wide economic integration can be expected to be accompanied by more of both. However, in the case of illegal international migration and the smuggling operations that control it, where one stands depends on where one sits, i.e., different nations have very different perspectives on what is unlawful. In some cases, legitimate refugees feel forced to use smugglers to get into countries and seek protection from persecution because doors for other means of finding protection have been closed.


UC Comparative Immigration and Integration Program
Managing Migration in the 21st Century
The Future of Labor Migration in Asia
Fall Workshop
October 9-10, 1998
Buehler Alumni Center
University of California, Davis

The purpose of this workshop is to promote comparative research on immigration and integration, and to make the research findings available to policy makers. Policy makers from governments and international organizations participate in each workshop. The papers presented at the workshops will be posted at: //

There is no charge to participate. If you plan to participate, please contact Philip Martin at: so that we can make appropriate meal arrangements.

Friday, October 9, 1998. Founders Boardroom, Buehler Alumni Center, UCD

Papers are posted at: //

8AM Continental breakfast

8:30AM CIIP purposes and goals, Philip Martin, UCD, Dick Buxbaum

8:35AM Introductions and 2-minute presentations on each participant's current comparative immigration and integration research.

9:15AM Theme 1. Recent Developments in the US and Germany

Bob Bach, Executive Associate Commissioner, INS

Bill Hing, UCD/UCB

Kay Hailbronner, Konstanz

Christine Kreuzer, Konstanz

Reinhard Lohrmann, IOM

10:30AM Break

10:45AM Theme 2. Integration of Immigrants

Susan Martin, Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown

Friedrich Heckmann, efms, Bamberg

Patrick Simon, INED, Paris

Jan Rath, Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, Amsterdam

Discussants: Roger Waldinger, UCLA, Ulf Häußler, Konstanz

12:30 Lunch

1:30PM Theme 3. Labor Migration in Asia

Overview, Ron Skeldon, Mahidol University, Thailand

Japan, Yasushi Iguchi, Kwansei Gakuin University

San Diego and Japan, Wayne Cornelius, UCSD

Korea, Kil-Sang Yoo

Discussant: Tetsuya Kobayashi, Dokkyo University

3:30PM Break

3:45PM Theme 4. Special Topics: Non-Migration, Shipping Companies

Thomas Straubhaar and Peter Fischer, Hamburg

Drew Keeling, UCB

Marc Rosenblum, UCSD

Discussant, Peter Lindert, UCD

5PM Adjourn

7PM Dinner, Mustard Seed, 222 D St, 758-5750

Saturday, October 10, 1998. Founders Boardroom, Buehler Alumni Center, UCD

8:30AM Continental breakfast

9AM Theme 4. Smuggling: Empirical and Policy Perspectives

Overview, Susan Martin

Germany and Eastern Europe, Kay Hailbronner, Konstanz

UN Perspective, Reinhard Lohrmann, IOM

Discussant: David Kyle, UCD

10:15AM Break

10:30 Smuggling and Illegal Immigration: Research Perspectives

David Kyle, UCD

David Spener, Trinity University

Rich Friman, Marquette University

Rey Koslowski, Rutgers

Discussant: Thomas Straubhaar, Hamburg

12noon Adjourn