Managing Migration in the 21st Century
Center for German and European Studies
Comparative Immigration and Integration Program
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
University of California, Davis
Friday-Saturday, October 10-11, 1997
U.S. Commission Report 1Binational Study on Mexico-US Migration 3Managing Migration: Welfare and Integration 5Managing Migration: Foreign Workers 7Managing Migration: Welfare 9Managing Migration: Temporary Status 11Managing Migration: Integration and Naturalization 13Managing Migration: Economic/Political Integration 15Agenda 18Press Clips 19
The 10th conference of the UC Comparative Immigration and Integration Program was held at UC-Davis October 10-11, 1997 in conjunction with the second meeting of the Managing Migration in the 21st Century program, which promotes comparative analysis of the migration patterns and integration issues in industrial democracies. An agenda and list of participants is attached, as well as several news clips. This report was not reviewed by speakers and participants.
U.S. Commission Report
The US Commission on Immigration Reform issued its final report, Becoming an American: Immigration and Immigrant Policy, on September 30, 1997. The Executive Director of the CIR, Susan Martin, and its Vice Chairman Michael Teitelbaum, summarized the CIR's major recommendations in Davis, viz,the US government should do more to "Americanize immigrants," that is, do more to help immigrants integrate into US society. The CIR recommended that resources for immigrant integration should come from US business, since it is the major US beneficiary of immigration: "Those business groups in particular who lobby for high levels of immigration must make a far greater effort not only to support immigration, but also to support immigrants, through English classes, naturalization and civic education."
The CIR emphasized that Americanization or integration is a two-way street. The US expects "immigrants to obey our laws, pay our taxes, respect other cultures and ethnic groups. At the same time, we ... also incur obligations -- to provide an environment in which newcomers can become fully participating members of our society."
Integration will be faster, the CIR found, if immigrants learn English quickly: "Rapid acquisition of English should be the paramount goal." Many immigrants want to learn English and US customs: the CIR urged new efforts to provide English language instruction, resource centers to provide information about US customs and culture to immigrants, and efforts to help established residents of the community adjust to the newcomers. The CIR did not recommend one method to "Americanize" newcomers. Instead, it recommended a federal grant program of $30 million a year to allow communities with immigrants to experiment with several strategies.
The CIR was of the view that, while immigration is in the national interest, the US does not have its immigration priorities right, does not administer immigration policy efficiently or effectively, and does not do enough to help immigrants and established residents to adjust to each other. For example, the CIR concluded that US immigration law has defined many categories of peopole who are allowed to immigrate, but not granted enough visas in any category to satisfy the demand for entry. Thus many qualified people wait their turn, and large backlogs are created. The CIR recommended that the US gradually reduce immigration to 550,000 per year (916,000 immigrants arrived in FY96), and that priority for entry be changed to emphasize the unification of nuclear families in the US and the admission of college-educated foreigners needed to fill US jobs.
As an example of distorted priorities and their effects, the CIR estimated that there are at least one million spouses and children of legal US immigrants waiting for immigrant visas. The average wait for entry is 4.5 years, and the delay induces the waiting family members to enter the US illegally. In order to unify families quickly, the CIR would add slots to reduce this backlog and still reduce overall immigration by eliminating the 65,000 visas per year available for US citizens to bring their adult brothers and sisters to the US. There are 1.7 million persons on the adult sibling waiting list, waiting times from some countries are over 10 years, and the median age at entry is 46, compared with 26 for other immigrants.
The CIR urged the US to do more to reduce illegal immigration, including the development of a national registry of the names and social security numbers of all persons authorized to work in the US. The CIR also endorsed stepped-up border control efforts such as Operation Hold-the-Line in El Paso, and Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego, and noted that more must be done to quickly remove from the US foreigners who are unlawfully present. The CIR urged that illegal aliens should receive no tax-supported benefits except for health care in emergencies and constitutionally-protected benefits, such as public education for illegal alien children.
The CIR favors full social safety benefits for legal immigrants, subject to the requirement that US sponsors of legal immigrants meet their obligations, i.e., the CIR opposed the exclusion of immigrants who arrived after August 22, 1996 from US welfare programs, but immigrants arriving after that date, when sponsor pledges to support them become binding, would still be barred from most welfare programs for five years after arrival.
The CIR recommended that the Immigration and Naturalization Service be strictly an enforcement agency, and that responsibility for admitting legal immigrants and naturalizing foreigners be shifted to the State Department. The Department of Labor would handle immigration employment. A new independent agency would be created to review immigration-related appeals; currently, there is no appeal of denials of many types of visa applications.
The CIR report was favorably received in the US media, although the INS opposed the proposed removal of its immigrant-service functions. Several participants questioned the call for Americanization, arguing that saying that the CIR's call to do more to integrate foreigners might add to the feeling that immigrants are not integrating, and thus that immigration should be reduced. In response, they were reminded that the late Barbara Jordan, the original Chairman of the Commission, often said that Americans will support immigration only if they believe it is in their self interest. The long-standing fear of many Americans that increasing diversity will disunite the country can be lessened if immigrants become American. That includes learning English and respecting US laws and customs. In the process, American cultures and norms will change as well.
Germans noted that "Germanization" would not be an acceptable term to use to promote the integration of foreigners in that country, and that the failure of most German politicians to acknowledge that Germany is a country of immigration makes it very difficult to launch the combined immigration and integration program recommended by the CIR. However, they noted that, in 1996 and 1997, several proposals were made to link the establishment of a quota immigration system with a new set of integration programs.
Binational Study on Mexico-US Migration
The Binational Study on Mexico-US Migration was requested by the Mexican and US presidents in 1994, and involved 10 Mexican and 10 US researchers to examine five issues: numbers, characteristics, factors that sustain migration, impacts in the US and Mexico, and policy responses.
The study estimated that there were seven million to 7.3 million Mexican-born persons in the US in 1996, up from 4.3 million in 1990. One-third or 2.3 to 2.4 million of the Mexican-born US residents were unauthorized, despite the legalization of two million unauthorized Mexicans in 1987-88, and subsequent legal immigration that unified their families. In 1996, Mexican immigrants represented about three percent of the US population, and eight percent of Mexico's population (the total US population was 265 million in 1996; Mexico's population was 96 million). The US population includes 11 million US-born persons of Mexican ancestry.
Mexican-born persons in the US can be divided into two groups. Sojourners tend to be tend to be young men who work in US agriculture and consider Mexico to be their usual residence, while settled Mexican-born persons are almost half women and most are employed outside of US agriculture. Many of the Mexican immigrants who have settled in the US are becoming naturalized US citizens, including 233,000 in FY96.
Most Mexican-born persons in the US have less than eight years of schooling and low US earnings and incomes. Low skills and earnings reflect in part US employer demand for workers in industries such as agriculture, manufacturing and services. Although education levels of Mexican immigrants are rising, so are US levels, so that the gap between the education of Mexican-born residents and all US residents is widening.
Mexico-US migration has its origins largely in the formal and informal recruitment of Mexican workers by US employers, and Mexico-US migration is sustained by factors that include low wages and unemployment in Mexico, as well as networks that sometimes make Mexicans more aware of vacant US jobs than are local residents. When the US government stopped the approved recruitment of Mexican workers in 1964, one migration channel was blocked, but Mexican migration flowed in other channels, much as a river forms a delta en route to the ocean. There is no package of policies in the US or Mexico to deal with all of these channels of entry.
Mexico-US migration has averaged about 300,000 per year over the past decade, but this may turn out to be the peak of Mexico-US migration. The number of new labor force entrants in Mexico is expected to fall from current levels of about a million per year to less than 550,000 by 2010, and sustained economic growth in Mexico should soon lead to enough additional jobs being created so that all new entrants can find jobs. Continued economic growth can help Mexico to catch up on needed job creation.
The major economic beneficiaries of Mexico-US migration are the migrants themselves, their US employers, and some US consumers. Mexico-to-US migration is relatively more important to Mexico than to the US. The five million Mexican-born workers employed in the US are equivalent to about one in six Mexicans with paid employment, and one in three Mexicans with a formal sector job, but Mexican-born workers in the US are fewer than one in 30 US workers.
Most Mexican migrants come from 109 of Mexico's 2,400 municipos, analogous to US counties, in nine of Mexico's 31 states. The binational study emphasized that, despite $4.4 billion in total remittances in 1995, migration also imposes costs on Mexico: it leads to the separation of families and imposes other costs on areas of origin.
Migration has been a major point of contention between Mexico and the US for most of the 20th century. Mexico-US cooperation increased, notably symbolized by NAFTA, providing more opportunities for cooperation in migration as well as trade. However, people in the two countries have very different perceptions of the benefits of Mexico-US migration. According to opinion polls, about two-thirds of Mexicans think that Mexico-US migration generates mostly benefits for the US, while two-thirds of Americans think that Mexico-US migration generates mostly costs for the US.
The study concluded that the US and Mexico should have regular consultations on migration; that both countries work to maximize the benefits of migration, such as reducing the costs of transferring remittances to Mexico; and that guest worker options be studied, but no large-scale program that admits unskilled Mexican workers be implemented at this time.
The discussion of the binational study emphasized that stepped-up border controls have increased the cost of illegal entry and may, paradoxically, have lengthened the average duration of stay in the US. It is hard to predict the future demand for unskilled Mexican workers in the US; jeans manufacturer Guess moved 2,000 sewing jobs from Los Angeles to Mexico after union organizing efforts, but other data suggests that Mexican workers are spreading to new areas and occupations in the US.
Managing Migration: Welfare and Integration
The US literature on the effects of immigrants on US labor markets is marked by two extremes. The "virtuous circle" perspective sees the presence of immigrant workers as creating economies of scale and multiplier effects, so that immigrants do not depress wages or displace resident workers. The view from the "vicious circle" perspective, on the other hand, is that immigrants depress wages or displace resident workers, and that their continued arrival can simply convert poverty abroad to poverty at home.
In the US, the virtuous circle dominated the research of the 1980s, when comparisons of the wages and unemployment rates of groups of workers most likely to compete with immigrants--women, Blacks, established immigrants--in cities with more and fewer immigrants concluded that wages and unemployment rates for these US residents were about the same in high immigration and low immigration cities. For example, studies that examined the wages of Blacks found their wages were about the same or higher in high-immigration Los Angeles as in low-immigration Atlanta.
These single-equation studies treat immigration as an exogenous independent variable--analogous to suddenly injecting a large number of immigrants into the closed Los Angeles labor market--and made indicators such as the wages or unemployment rates of Blacks dependent variables. The failure of such studies to find the effects of immigration on wages and unemployment predicted by economic theory led George Borjas to conclude that "modern econometrics cannot detect a single shred of evidence that immigrants have a sizable adverse impact on the earnings and employment opportunities of natives in the United States" (Borjas, 1990, p. 81).
In the 1990s, the nature of the empirical studies and the conclusions of labor market studies changed for several reasons, including new data, new methods and more immigrants. First, 1990 Census data became available--7.3 million immigrants arrived in the 1980s. Second, models became more sophisticated, allowing, for example, for the possibility that Black workers who compete with immigrants in Los Angeles might move away from Los Angeles. With that new premise, it became plain that confining the analysis of the effect of immigrant workers to the wages and working conditions of the remaining Black workers in Los Angeles could result in an underestimation of their overall effect, since some of the Black workers may have moved to other cities, holding down wages there. Internal migration, in other words, may diffuse the effects of immigration throughout the US, making it hard to detect immigration's impacts in any one city such as Los Angeles.
The conclusions of the 1990s studies were in line with what economic theory would predict: more immigrant workers are associated with lower wages and higher unemployment rates. These effects are not necessarily visible in the areas with the immigrant workers since, in the flexible US labor market and economy, their effects are quickly transmitted throughout the US.
Germany has for decades pursued the seemingly contradictory goals of promoting the return of resident foreigners who wish to leave, and integrating those who wish to stay. Definitions imply solutions or remedies to many social problems, and German debates about how best to integrate foreigners often reflect different definitions of what integration means. Friederich Heckmann defined integration as a process in which newcomers adapt to the social structure that they enter on arrival. The social structure, in turn, changes as a consequence of their settlement. The resulting links or connections between foreigners and natives in the newly mixed popoulation gives rise to altered social, economic, legal and cultural systems in which the extent of integration can be assessed.
There are four dimensions of integration:
structural integration refers to variables such as legal status, level of education, and labor market status; Germany is distinctive for the obstacles it imposes to full legal integration for foreigners
cultural integration refers to foreigners accepting or accommodating themselves to the values and norms of the host society, and natives adapting to the presence of foreigners and their value systems. One indicator that suggests rapid integration is foreigners' knowledge of German. In 1995, 55 percent of the foreigners in Germany knew German, and 95 percent of the children born to resident foreigners had the language. Many of the most difficult integration policy issues involve how much foreigners should change, and how much Germans should change as a result of new cultures and norms
social integration refers to links between foreigners and natives. German data suggest that half or more of the foreigners in Germany have German friends
identity integration asks foreigners who they are. In one 1995 survey, only 11 percent of the foreigners in Germany considered themselves German. Germany lacks a model for the way in which newcomers might become "German". Without a history of officially sanctioned immigration, Germany lacks political symbols such as the big American naturalization ceremonies staged on on national holidays to celebrate the role of immigration in national renewal and rebirth.
Heckmann concludes that integration in Germany is "welfare state integration"--full access to the welfare state, but not full acceptance as fellow citizens and future leaders. Germany has gone from a reluctant land of immigration to a reluctant land of integration.
Three scenarios are possible: status quo, minority and underclass formation, or acculturation and new nation building. Heckmann noted that integration discussions in Germany have sometimes come in reaction to populist protests, some of which became violent, as for example the burning of houses that housed foreign residents.
Managing Migration: Foreign Workers
Project-tied workers are temporary foreigner workers who, by definition, are not intended to be integrated into German society; they are Polish or Czech workers temporarily assigned by their employers to Germany. Project-tied workers enter Germany under bilateral agreements, Werkvertragsabkommen, negotiated with Eastern European countries, that include quotas by country; average employment was 90,000 in 1992 [a maximum 100,000 per year was set in December 1992], and was 54,000 in 1996.
The purpose of project-tied employment is to promote mutually beneficial transactions between Germany and its neighbors. Germany gets work done more cheaply, and perhaps absorbs some otherwise illegal workers, while Eastern Europeans earn foreign exchange and acquaint themselves with advanced construction techniques. As this bargain has worked out, however, the use of project-tied workers seems to have ended social consensus in the German construction industry, producing a situation analagous to that in American agriculture -- high unemployment among local construction workers, German employers arguing that they can compete with other construction firms only if they can bring in project-tied workers, and charges of exploitation of foreign workers in Germany.
Beginning October 1, 1997, the project-tied system has been suspended, largely because the EU Commission in Brussels ruled that it was against EU policy to allow only German companies to employ project-tied foreign workers in Germany--a French company operating in Germany had been denied permission to employ Polish project-tied workers.
Although project-tied third country or non-EU employment is strictly limited, the migration of workers inside the EU is encouraged, and the EU seems willing to strike down national attempts to restrict intra-EU mobility. As the project-tied system shrank, the intra-EU movement of workers increased, so that, in 1996, it was estimated that about 210,000 workers from EU countries outside Germany were employed on German construction sites, four times the number of project-tied workers.
EU firms are free to post EU nationals to work in Germany, but what about, for example, a Dutch company that wants to send EU nationals who do not yet have freedom of movement rights to work in Germany, say, Polish workers after Poland is admitted to the EU, but before Poles have freedom of movement rights? In a 1990 case (C-113/89 - Rush Portuguese Lda) the EU Court of Justice decided that the freedom to provide services clause of the EU Treaty, Articles 59 and 60, permitted EU workers who did not yet have freedom of movement rights to work in another EU country. For example, France could not block the use of Portuguese workers in France in 1990 on the grounds that Portuguese workers would not have freedom of movement rights until 1992 [employers of non-EU foreigners in France must pay a significant administrative fee].
The Court of Justice decision said that a "person providing a service may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue his activity in the State where the service is provided 'under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals'." Thus, France could not treat the Portuguese workers as third country nationals because the Portuguese firm that employed them had the freedom to provide services anywhere in the EU, and it could take its workers with it to provide these services.
In 1994, in the case C-43/93 Vander Elst, the EU Court went farther, finding that a Belgian demolition firm that employed both Belgians and Moroccans on a job in France did not have to obtain the French work permits that are required for all non-EU foreigners employed in France. According to the Court, lawfully-established EU firms can send any of their workers abroad temporarily "to provide services" and thus be exempt from national legislation requiring work permits, etc. for non-EU foreign workers.
With freedom of movement making it easier for firms to transfer workers across borders within the EU, unions and governments in high-wage countries such as Germany are fighting back with rules and directives that aim to reduce incentives to send workers from a low-wage country such as Portugal to jobs in high-wage Germany. By December 16, 1999, EU member states are supposed to adopt national legislation that establishes at least minimum labor protection standards for all workers employed in the country, including project-tied and similar workers posted temporarily. Some think that the court's wording may permit, for example, agreements reached between unions and employers to be extended to all workers: "Community law does not preclude Member States from extending their legislation, or collective labour agreements entered into by both sides of industry relating to minimum wages, to any person who is employed, even temporarily, within their territory, no matter in which country the employer is established."
Germany on February 26, 1996 adopted an Entsendegesetz, rules that establish minimum protections and conditions for all workers employed in German construction. Beginning January 1, 1997, the minimum wage negotiated in the German construction sector must be paid to all workers employed on German construction sites. Employers are required to make enforcement easier by reporting the names of workers and their duration of stay and place of work to authorities and signing a form that certifies their compliance with the Entsendegesetz. However, some of the employers who have been fined for violations of the minimum wage negotiated between German employers and unions have announced that they will challenge the new law as interference with the right to provide services anywhere in the EU.
Managing Migration: Welfare
Starting from opposite ends of the welfare and political integration spectrums, it appears that the US and Germany are taking the first steps toward convergence. In the US, access by foreigners to (comparatively low) welfare benefits has been restricted, especially by legislation in 1995-96, but the path to naturalization remains relatively easy. In Germany, where immigrants as well as persons applying for asylum have had full access to relatively generous benefits, access is being restricted, and naturalization may be made easier.
The US is facing a mismatch in integration policy: the number of newly--arrived immigrants who have low levels of education, little or no English, and low US earnings is increasing, while federal support for poor people, and especially poor immigrants, is decreasing. The US adopted a welfare reform in August 1996 that was expected to reduce welfare spending on legal immigrants by $24 billion over five years; in 1997, about $11 billion in federal spending on welfare benefits for those legal immigrants in the US before August 22, 1996 was restored.
In 1996, Michael Fix noted, the US began to convert national welfare programs into state programs. This is expected to lead to variation in approaches to assisting poor people, including immigrants. Under welfare reform, states may provide or restrict welfare benefits to legal immigrants, and some feared a race to the bottom, as states sought to save money by reducing benefits for non-voters. States have not done this. Most states have followed the federal government, providing assistance to legal immigrants in the US before August 22, 1996; only Alabama excludes immigrants from all welfare programs.
Fix concluded that, increasingly, immigration policy will merge with US urban policy, since most immigrants move into cities, and so it is there that issues such as how to teach non-English speaking and often poor children will arise. Surprisingly, continuing illegal immigration, and the evolution of several identification systems, each done badly, may lend support to the development of a national ID system. Finally, he observed, many years after the US declared a war on poverty that encouraged the migration of poor people from rural to urban areas, the country must explore ways of improving the lot of poor rural people - many of whom are now immigrants - in the places where they live.
Schumacher explained that Germany's social welfare system is comprehensive, covering needs that range from health care to UI benefits to pensions, and is generally funded by contributions from workers and employers. Those who need assistance and have not been employed, and thus were not making contributions, are nonetheless legally entitled to welfare or social assistance, currently DM538 ($307) per month for the head of household, plus 80 percent of this sum for the spouse, DM430, plus 50 to 90 percent of the standard DM538 for each child, plus additional supplements.
In addition, poor residents are entitled to housing and utilities. The federal government provided about 25 percent of the DM52 billion ($30 billion) spent on 2.5 million welfare recipients in 1995, including 525,000 foreigners--foreigners are about eight percent of German residents, and 20 percent of welfare recipients. Local governments paid 75 percent, and administered the welfare assistance.
Generally speaking, no distinctions are made between foreigners and Germans in the welfare and social security systems. Established foreigners are required to make the same contributions as Germans, and receive the same benefits, including children's allowances, DM220 a month for the first and second children, DM300 for the third, and DM350 for each succeeding child.
Asylum seekers are handled in a separate welfare system under the Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz, and most of the benefits they receive are in-kind, especially when they are living in reception centers. Outside these government-financed centers, asylum seekers receive DM360 per month for up to 36 months for the head of household, DM 310 each for persons over seven, and DM220 for each under-seven year old, plus DM80 per month in pocket money for those over 14. Asylum seekers are expected to perform work for these benefits, and they receive an additional DM2 per hour for such work.
In 1995, 489,000 foreigners received asylum benefits that totaled DM5.3 billion, (US$3 billion). Until May 1997, asylum seekers leaving reception centers after three months were given work permits; they are no longer given work permits as they leave reception centers, so that assistance costs for them may rise.
Marcelli reported on a survey of unauthorized Mexicans in Los Angeles that found that a significant number of persons in households headed by unauthorized persons obtained welfare benefits, including the US-born and thus US-citizen children in such households who are eligible for welfare benefits. Nevertheless, compared to similar residents with the same levels of income, usage of welfare benefits was generally lower in households headed by unauthorized Mexicans. For those who think that unauthorized foreigners should receive no welfare benefits, any use of welfare benefits is too much, even those paid to eligible US-born children who, they argue, would not be in the US if illegal immigration were ended.
Reerman noted that Germany receives most of Europe's asylum seekers, and that Germany is among the European nations with the most generous benefits for asylum seekers, prompting him to conclude that some asylum seekers enter Germany to obtain welfare benefits, where the mere facts of physical presence and application for asylum trigger entry into the welfare system. German law permits the government to deny benefits to foreigners who enter the country only for such benefits, but the burden of proof is on the government to prove that entry was only to receive benefits. The law is rarely invoked.
Reerman believes that EU nations will come under growing pressure to standardize welfare benefits, especially for foreigners and asylum seekers. The welfare benefits available to asylum seekers include housing, cash or in-kind benefits, and medical care. All European nations in theory provide housing for asylum seekers, but neither Austria nor Belgium necessarily provide housing to all those who apply for asylum. Most states provide cash or in-kind assistance to asylum seekers, but often at lower than regular levels; France cuts benefits with length of stay, while Germany increases benefits with duration of stay. Benefits increase from south to north; Italy and Portugal provide limited assistance, while Greece and Spain provide no cash benefits to asylum seekers.
These first steps toward convergence have an analogy in trade policy. US practice on assisting poor countries that send migrants to the US is often summarized as "trade, not aid", referring to the tendency of the US to give Mexico and other emigration nations the opportunity to export goods to the US, but to grant them little or no aid. Western Europe's policies, by contrast, are sometimes characterized as "aid, not trade", referring to the willingness to send aid money to northern Africa, but to restrict opportunities to export the farm commodities that these countries could export.
Managing Migration: Temporary Status
In the US, Soule noted that elites--defined by higher levels of education and income--have been most accepting of immigrants, which may reflect the fact that they are most likely to benefit from the presence of unskilled immigrant workers such as household workers, and less likely to compete with them in the labor market. Polls suggest that, from 1965 to 1993, the proportion of Americans favoring increased immigration has been stable at about seven percent. The number of respondents favoring less immigration, however, rose from 33 percent in 1965, when immigration was low, to 61 percent in 1993.
The debate about immigration became more heated in the 1990s in the US and especially in California which has 12 percent of the US population and one-third of all immigrants. Factors contributing to the increased notice taken of immigration include the recession of 1990-91, which was especially severe in California, the debate about the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, and the search for ways to balance the federal budget. Other factors that focused attention on immigration included well-publicized terrorist attacks by immigrants, especially the World Trade Center bombing, and welfare cuts that affected new immigrants more than citizens and long-established residents.
In California, unemployment rates reached 50-year highs in 1990-91, and illegal immigration continued despite growing economic integration with Mexico, setting the stage for voter approval of Proposition 187 in 1994. Proposition 187, which has not been implemented due to legal challenges, would establish a state-run screening system to ensure that unauthorized aliens did not receive state-funded services.
By 1997, with unemployment at a 25-year low, polls found that Americans were almost evenly divided on the merits of immigration. A June 1997 Knight-Ridder poll found that 45 percent of respondents said immigration benefits the nation, 42 percent said it hurts, and 10 percent said its effects are mixed. A June 1997 Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll found that 49 percent of respondents thought that immigration has mostly negative effects on the US and 44 percent thought that immigration has mostly positive effects.
Kerber asked whether temporary protected status is an effective means for providing temporary protection for large numbers of foreigners fleeing civil war or other troubles, and concluded that TPS may be a "viable future option to solve the problems coming along with mass-influx of refugees." After Bosnia was recognized in April 1992, Bosnians needed visas to enter Germany. On May 22, 1992, the German interior minister agreed to provide three-month visas to 39,200 Bosnians in Germany, and this status was later converted to "toleration" or Duldung until the situation in Bosnia permitted return. However, in May 22, 1992 it was decided not to deport Bosnians to Bosnia, and 80 percent of the peak 360,000 Bosnians in Germany received a Duldung until they could be returned.
Bosnians in Germany were often housed with asylum seekers or friends and relatives. About 43,000 or 12 percent of the Bosnians applied for asylum in Germany, but in June 1993, Germany suspended the consideration of Bosnian asylum applications, and many Bosnians withdrew their applications; those whose applications were considered were generally rejected. After October 1996, Bosnian applications are once again being processed.
Germany's Constitutional Court in its 1989 Tamil decision held that asylum can be granted under Article 16 (2) (2) of the German Constitution only if the applicant suffers persecution at the hands of the state, and that the state can be adjudged to have persecuted individuals only if it has had effective control over the territory. Thus, in a condition of civil war such as that in Bosnia, courts generally ruled that there was no persecution by the government, and no right to asylum in Germany. In August 1996, the Constitutional Court ruled that the leaders of breakaway Republika Srpska had acquired the abililty to persecute individuals, but that Muslims in Serb areas could have fled to the safety of Muslim-controlled areas rather than seeking asylum abroad, so that Bosnians Muslims have no claim to asylum under the German Constitution.
The Dayton agreement of December 1995 foresees the return of all Bosnians to their places of origin, and Germany on March 31, 1996 ended the ban on deportations to Bosnia. Germany is encouraging voluntary returns, offering DM1800 per family return payments to some 37,000 persons in the first seven months of 1997.
Of the 345,000 Bosnians with some form of TPS in Germany, about 65,000 or 20 percent returned voluntarily to Bosnia by July 1997; 21,000 or one-third of those returning so far had been in Bavaria. Only 300 Bosnians have been formally deported. There have been many problems with returns, including the reluctance of some Bosnian local governments to register returning Bosnians; registration is necessary to obtain accommodation and food from voluntary organizations, and there is a tendency to think that the limited supplies available should go first to those who did not leave for Germany and receive return bonuses.
Managing Migration: Integration and Naturalization
Germany is the major country of immigration in Europe. Of the 20 million foreigners in Europe, including EU nationals living outside their country of citizenship, about seven million, one-third, live in Germany.
Klos noted that foreigners in Germany can have one of six residence permits, from an unlimited residence right (Aufenthaltsberechtigung) to an unlimited residence permit, (unbeschrâ€°nkte Aufenthaltserlaubnis) to a residence permit limited to a specific reason for being in Germany (Aufenthaltsbewilligung) analogous to the F-1 visa that permits a foreign student to live and study in the US as a nonimmigrant.
In 1996 and 1997, four proposals have been made to link the introduction of an immigration system with new programs to integrate resident foreigners:
the FDP's Zuwanderungsregelungsgesetz proposal of February 9, 1996 would establish a quota-based immigration system, and promote integration through a variety of courses to help foreigners integrate during their first five years in Germany; foreigners completing such courses could receive "integration certificates" that entitle them to unlimited rather than limited work permits (unlimited work permits are issued without a labor market test; limited work permits are issued only after the labor department specifies that no Germans or established foreigners are available to fill the job).
the state of Rhineland-Palatinate in March 1997 proposed an immigration quota system with an integration program that would require foreigners, at their own cost, to participate in German language and culture classes to obtain secure residence and work permits.
the Green Party-BÂ¸ndnis 90 in April 1997 proposed an immigration system that would admit as many immigrants as ethnic Germans, which would mean about 200,000 immigrants per year. To promote integration, employers and government would share the cost of providing language and culture classes on a 50-50 basis, and immigrants could participate at no charge.
The Social Democratic Party in April 1997 also proposed to provide at no charge language and culture classes for foreigners during their first three years in Germany.
Kreuzer noted that 50 percent of the foreigners in Germany have lived there for 10 or more years, but relatively few of these long-term resident foreigners have become German citizens, limiting their right to participate in government. Some have proposed local voting rights for resident foreigners, but in 1989, Germany's constitutional court declared that there is a bond between "being a German national and belonging to the German people," and that those who want to increase the political rights of foreigners in Germany should expedite the "naturalization of aliens who have settled permanently in the Federal Republic of Germany" rather than seek to grant voting rights to foreigners.
Germany has been simplifying its naturalization procedures. Until 1990, naturalization was possible only under the Reichs- und StaatsangehÃ rigkeitsgesetz of 1913. Relatively few foreigners naturalized under this law, some 12,000 to 17,000 per year in the 1970s and 1980s.
Revisions in 1990 and 1993 have liberalized the requirements-- at least 10 years legal residence, knowledge of German, giving up the old nationality-- but still make granting of German nationality to most kinds of foreigners a discretionary act. It was remarked that rejecting an application requires one signature, but accepting a naturalization application requires three signatures. In 1995, there were about 320,000 naturalizations in Germany, but only 35,000 of these were of the discretionary variety, Ermessenseinbuergungen; the others were for persons who had a right to naturalize, Anspruchseinbuergerungen, including ethnic Germans who moved to Germany and second and third generation foreigners born in Germany who had a right to German citizenship under 1990 and 1993 laws.
There are proposals for more liberalization, including making German citizenship automatic for some foreigners born in Germany--an SPD proposal would make a child born in Germany entitled to German citizenship if at least one parent was born in Germany and is is usually resident there.
In the Fall of 1994, the governing coalition parties proposed automatic transition to German nationality for some third-generation foreign children. Under the KinderstaatszugehÃ rigkeit, at least one of the parents must have been born in Germany, both must have lived in Germany for at least 10 years, and both must possess unlimited residence rights. At 18, children born in such situations could automatically become German citizens, provided that they give up any other nationality. Germany continues to debate how to reform naturalization in 1997, with most observers expecting change after elections in 1998.
Managing Migration: Economic/Political Integration
If TPS leads to permanent settlement undesired by the countries of destination, and integration of newcomers poses difficult challenges are there alternatives? Can economic and political integration of existing countries serve as a substitutes for migration?
Martin noted that the United States is the world's major country of immigration, and Mexico is the world's major country of emigration. As with US-Mexican trade in goods, there is an asymmetry in Mexico-US migration patterns. The United States accepts immigrants from many nations, but virtually all Mexican emigrants head for the United States.
NAFTA was expected to usher in a new era in Mexico-US migration, turning a people relationship into a trading partnership: a typical statement was that of US Attorney General Janet Reno in 1993, who said: "We will not reduce the flow of illegal immigration until these immigrants can find decent jobs at decent wages in Mexico."
In the long run, the economic growth and job creation accelerated by free trade and investment policies promote what has been called stay-at-home development. But emigration pressures do not cease when an emigration country such as Mexico adopts growth-accelerating economic policies. Indeed, the US Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development concluded the opposite: "The economic development process itself tends in the short to medium term to stimulate migration." In other words, the increased migration pressures that are now obvious in Mexico were widely predicted but ignored in the run-up to NAFTA.
The same economic policies that increase illegal emigration pressures in the short run often reduce them in the longer run. The "migration hump," or a temporary increase in immigration followed by an eventual decline, results from a combination of demand-pull factors in the US as trade increases, more supply-push pressures in Mexico as that economy restructures for global competition and reforms its agricultural sector, and networks that effectively bridge the border. However, if Mexico-to-US. migration is viewed over several decades rather than several years, then there should be less migration with the free trade and investment policies formalized by NAFTA than without them. A migration hump that adds 10 to 20 percent to current Mexican immigration for 10 years, but then reduces economically-motivated migration sharply, may be preferable to 300,000 or more Mexican immigrants--two-thirds of them illegal arrivals--each year as far as the eye can see.
Martin emphasized that politicians were aware of the migration hump, but those supporting NAFTA found it hard to make a no-pain, no-gain migration argument for an already controversial agreement. Instead, the implication of most NAFTA supporters was that NAFTA would usher in a new era of hope in Mexico that would keep migrants at home. When Mexico permitted the peso to become over-valued in 1994, setting the stage for devaluation and recession, the migration hump went even higher than expected.
Polilcy analysts examining trade and migration linkages in other areas may want to devise "grand bargains" under which the emigration country desiring a free trade agreement agrees to cooperate with the immigration country in managing migration, at least during the 5 to 15 year migration hump.
Weber noted that the EU has reached "Europe Agreements" with a number of Eastern European countries in preparation for their entry into the EU. These agreements do not provide for freedom of movement of workers, but they do open the door to some freedom of movement by self-employed persons seeking to provide services or to establish companies in EU nations, the so-called right of free establishment. This self-employment option may open the door to craftsmen who want to work on EU building sites, as British workers have done in Germany. When Greece, Spain and Portugal joined the EU, their nationals had to wait 7 years for full freedom of movement as workers.
Thiery noted that the Schengen agreement was signed by five countries in June 1985, and went into effect between Benelux, France, Germany, Portugal and Spain on March 26, 1995. The agreement has since been expanded so that all EU nations, except UK and Ireland, have agreed to join, and Schengen may become part of EU law. Schengen distinguishes between short stays--up to three months--and longer stays, and the country of entry has the responsibility to ensure that arriving foreigners have valid travel documents and other papers. Third-country nationals established in Germany, for example, now have the right to travel freely throughout Schengen countries.
It might be noted that, although Schengen prohibits border immigration checks, it does permit (1) checks on foreigners inside the border and (2) border inspections for insects, contraband, and the like.
Schengen and the associated Dublin convention signed in June 1990 operate on the principle that the first signatory country that a foreigner reaches is responsible for making decisions on admission, etc. that bind the rest of the signatories. For example, if a foreigner reaches Germany and seeks asylum there, but is found to have entered Schengenland at, say, a French port, Germany can request that France deal with the asylum application. In 1996, Germany requested that other countries handle 1330 asylum applicants. Of these, 918 were accepted by neighboring countries, with France taking 566.
Managing Migration in the 21st Century
Center for German and European Studies
International and Area Studies
Comparative Immigration and Integration Program
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
University of California, Davis
Friday-Saturday, October 10-11, 1997
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Friday, October 10, 1997, Buehler Alumni Center, UC-Davis
7:30AM Continental Breakfast
8:30-10 AM What Next for Immigration? The Final Report and Recommendations of the US Commission on Immigration Reform
Susan Forbes Martin, Executive Director, Commission on Immigration Reform
Michael Teitelbaum, Vice-Chair, Commission on Immigration Reform
10:30 AM CIIP purposes and goals, Philip Martin, UCD, Richard Buxbaum, UCB
11AM The Recommendations of the Bi-National US-Mexican Migration Study. Moderator, Lindsay Lowell, CIR, Manuel Garcia y Griego, UCI, Philip Martin, UCD, Ed Taylor, UCD
Discussant: Wayne Cornelius, UCSD
1:15PM Managing Migration in the 21st Century: Integrating Immigrants in the US and Germany when Labor Markets and Welfare Systems are Under Stress
Introduction, Kay Hailbronner, Uni Konstanz and Philip Martin, UCD
Session 1. Overview of Labor Market Impacts and Immigrant Integration Patterns
1. J Edward Taylor, UC Davis
2. Friedrich Heckmann, Uni Bamberg
Discussants, William A.V. Clark, UCLA and Volker Gronert, Uni Konstanz
2:45PM Session 2. Welfare Systems and Immigrant Integration Patterns,
1. The New Era in Immigrant Policy, Michael Fix, Urban Institute
2. Social Benefits of Asylum Seekers, Illegal Immigrants and De-Facto Refugees, Dr. Christoph Schumacher, Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Bonn
Session 3. Case Studies
1. Unauthorized Mexican Immigration and Welfare in Los Angeles County, Enrico Marcelli, UCSD
2. Costs of Caring for Foreigners: An EU Comparison, Olaf Reerman, Bundesministerium des Innern
Discussants: Manuel Garcia y Griego, UCI, Kay Hailbronner, Uni Konstanz
7:00PM Dinner by invitation, Hunan Restaurant, 508 Second Street, Davis (Entrance up stairs)
Saturday, October 11, 1997, IGA, Shields Library, Third Floor
8AM Continental Breakfast
8:30AM Session 4. Public Opinion and Temporary Protected Status
1. Public Opinion, Suzanne Soule, UCSB
2. Bosnians with Temporary Protected Status in Germany, Caroline Kerber, Uni Konstanz
Discussants: Keiko Yamanaka, UC Berkeley, Jeanette Money, UCD
10:15AM Session 5. Intergration and Naturalization
1. German Integration Policy, Christian Klos
2. Reforming Germany's Citizenship Law, Christine Kreuzer
Discussant: Kevin Johnson, UCD
11:45AM Session 6. Economic and political integration and migration: Alternatives to TPS and Integration
1. Nafta and Migration after three years, Philip Martin, UC Davis
2. European Agreements with Eastern European States, Claus Weber, Uni Konstanz
3. The Schengen Agreement, Claus Thiery, Uni Konstanz
Discussant: Reinhard Lohrmann, IOM
1PM Adjourn. Lunch on your own.
Panel's plan: immigrant assimilation; Integration into American communities recommended
By Diane Lindquist, San Diego Union Tribune, October 12, 1997
DAVIS -- New recommendations that the U.S. government do more to "Americanize" legal immigrants might face their greatest test in California.
The call for a better method to help documented migrants integrate into the U.S. communities in which they settle is among a broad array of sweeping immigration policy changes the Commission on Immigration Reform made in its final report Sept. 30.
Still known by many as the "Jordan Commission" in honor of its one-time chairwoman, the late Rep. Barbara Jordan of Texas, the panel spent five years working to advise congress on a more credible, coherent immigrant and immigration policy.
Proposals to restrict legal migration and to break up the duties of the Immigration and Naturalization Service have drawn most of the public attention. But Susan Forbes Martin, the commission's executive director, said the members considered the lack of programs to "Americanize" legal immigrants "the most serious deficiency of U.S. immigration policy."
Martin and commission members and researchers on the project spoke here at the University of California Davis late last week kicking off a nationwide campaign to build support for the recommendations.
The House immigration subcommittee plans to take up many of the report's issues this month. Subcommittee chairman Rep. Lamar Smith, R-Texas, has said the group's work has changed the debate on immigration policy.
Still, the federal government should not be the only entity that makes a greater effort to "Americanize" legal immigrants, said Michael Teitelbaum, the commission's vice chair.
"California is probably the single state that needs to do the most in integrating immigrants," he said.
California has more legal immigrants -- 6 million -- than any other U.S. state. Moreover, about 40 percent of its 2 million illegal migrants are spouses and offspring of legal migrants who have applications pending for legalization.
"State and local governments should find creative ways to integrate these migrants," Teitelbaum said. "When California officials complain about federal immigration policy -- its failures, its absurdities -- they have to understand that a lot of it has been enacted under the insistence of California politicians."
One commission proposal to help towns and cities integrate immigrants into their communities would establish local clearinghouses to provide school systems, health clinics, organizations and immigrants themselves information on relevant federal and state laws and their effects, Martin said. When immigrant disputes arise, the clearinghouses could also serve as mediation centers, she said.
"We're not talking about a huge investment of dollars, probably $30 million, that would go in grants to communities that have immigrants already, or that are having a large influx of immigrants," Martin said.
California cities and towns, already a destination for many migrants, have experienced the nation's sharpest rise in migrants over the past decade.
In the Central Valley, the increase has created pockets of poverty amid the region's agricultural prosperity as more and more Mexicans have crossed the border in search of work. For instance, the population of Madera, a typical town located north of Fresno, has swelled from 21,000 in 1980 to 35,000 today, with an estimated 42 percent to 54 percent rise in Latino residents.
As a result, said Juan Arambula, a Harvard-educated lawyer who grew up in a Pixley labor camp and now is a Fresno County supervisor, has seen ethnic and generational splits that have led to numerous "us-vs.-them" ballot initiatives that have worsened the situation.
"The idea that we benefited and we should put something back into the common pot is starting to erode," he said.
A third of Fresno County school students are classified as having limited ability to speak English, said Fresno State University researcher Bert Mason.
Education was the most important of three areas that the Commission on Immigration Reform said should be addressed, executive director Martin said. The others were orientation-information sharing and the naturalization process.
All are vital, she said, not only to help immigrants become adjusted to life in the United States but to obtain the tools to sustain themselves and grow in the United States. The proposals to better "Americanize" immigrants also will help Americans already here benefit from immigrant contributions.
"The law has changed, and there's been a fine line drawn between legal immigration and American citizens. We think that is the wrong place to draw the line, that it should be between illegal immigrants on one side and legal immigrants and citizens on the other," Martin said.
Dan Walters: Immigration clashes loom, Sacramento Bee, October 12, 1997
For nearly three years, federal Judge Mariana Pfaelzer has been sitting on Proposition 187, the California ballot measure that would deny public benefits to undocumented immigrants.
Pfaelzer struck down portions of the measure but has refused to issue a final ruling that would then allow its validity to be tested in appellate courts.
It's an astonishing exercise in judicial arrogance. But it does not alter the underlying reality: immigrants, legal and otherwise, are pouring into California and are the single most important factor in determining what the state becomes in the 21st century. Latinos are expected to become the state's largest ethnic group by 2020.
Nor does Judge Pfaelzer's studied indecision alter the fact that the politics of immigration will continue to seethe, tinged with racial conflict and ideological confusion and creating a perilous minefield for those who seek office.
One example of that uncertainty: After years of ducking the immigration debate -- despite its clear connection to environmental issues -- the Sierra Club will finally conduct a straw vote of its membership on the subject. Another: A ballot measure that would effectively end bilingual education is headed for the 1998 ballot and Republican politicians are unsure whether to embrace it, as most GOP voters prefer, or shun it to avoid offending Latino voters.
If politicians see immigration as a headache, however, it is not one that they can ignore simply because of its real-world impact.
As the federal government -- under huge pressure from Californians -- tightens down on border controls in the San Diego area, for example, it is pushing the flow of immigration further east, into the harsh desert of the Imperial Valley, and that is increasing the physical danger to those who yearn to come to California.
And, according to a new book that delves into the impact of immigration, the tighter controls may be having precisely the opposite of the intended effect.
Mexicans who once would seasonally commute to work in California's fields are now being encouraged, in effect, to become permanent California residents because of increasing difficulty, cost and danger of making repeated border crossings.
That, coupled with harsh economic conditions in Mexico and a trend among California farmers to switch to higher-value, more labor-intensive fruits and vegetable crops, has meant a transformation of many small California farm towns into pockets of intense poverty, the authors of "Poverty Amid Prosperity" conclude.
"Mexico today is like Mississippi in the 1950s," says University of California, Davis, economist Philip Martin, one of the book's authors. "It's on the verge of a great migration."
"It might be harder to get into the U.S., but once here, it's easy to get a job," says Martin.
The book describes how this trend of migrants becoming permanent residents has transformed a number of rural California towns, especially those in the central San Joaquin Valley such as Parlier.
"Rural California towns begin to look more and more like rural Mexico," says J. Edward Taylor of UC Davis, another author, describing "a circular relationship between farm employment and immigration."
Immigration into California, and its myriad impacts on the state's social and economic fabric, are not likely to abate and, as Martin says, "there's no magic bullet solution. It's much easier to describe the problem than the solution."
It would be a mistake to assume that the rising level of political conflict over immigration is merely the handiwork of some wedge issue politicians. Judge Pfaelzer may be sitting on Proposition 187 but other clashes are inevitable.
Diana Griego Erwin: The 'Americanizing' experience, Sacramento Bee, October 12, 1997.
As history, attitudes and recent political campaigns prove, immigration has long been one of the most contentious and charged issues facing California and the rest of the nation.
Funny then, that Michael S. Teitelbaum, a demographer at the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, would find deliberations on the subject remarkably uncontentious -- once one gets to the facts.
It took seven years.
In 1990 Teitelbaum became vice chair of the bipartisan U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, a body convened by Congress to assess which immigration policies would serve the nation best.
The consensus that developed surprised him. Speaking at the University of California, Davis recently, Teitelbaum admitted that when he first learned of the political and ideological diversity of the commission, he told his wife "there was no way this commission would agree on anything, including what day it is."
He was wrong.
The commission issued its fourth and final report recently and each of its recommendations were "unanimous or unanimous minus one," Teitelbaum said.
The most controversial -- vast structural changes of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service -- received a lot of press. But some of the commission's most innovative ideas include viewing the nation's job ahead as immigrant policy, not just immigration policy. The distinction is enormous.
Immigration policies decide who we let in, how many, the rules and regs.
Immigrant policies address how immigrants become productive once here.
The commission calls this "Americanization," a controversial term highjacked by racists and xenophobes in the 1920s.
"But it is our word, and we're taking it back," the commission's esteemed chair, Rep. Barbara Jordan, D-Texas, said before her death in January1996.
As the commission report explains, Americanization requires something from immigrants and citizens alike. Immigrants must obey laws, pay taxes,respect other cultures and groups; citizens must provide environments through which newcomers can become participating members of society.
This cultivates "a share commitment to the American values of liberty, democracy and equal opportunity," the commission said. No fact-tangling discussion of "whose values?" necessary there.
The commission found little such cultivation. "What do we expect from the immigrants we admit?" Teitelbaum asked. "Do we help them? Where do they learn English? ... Frankly, we didn't like what we saw."
The commission is pushing for ideas such as establishing welcome centers to initiate immigrants in U.S. history, law and democratic principles and to outline available government and private services. English is a critical survival skill, the commission found, but immigrants are largely left on their own to learn it.
For schoolchildren, no one English program or approach works better than others; community support, well-trained teachers and aides and parental involvement make the difference, they found.
Meanwhile, barriers -- fewer immigrant services, waiting lists for English classes -- only lengthen the Americanization process, the commission said.
The naturalization process also is wanting. Tests need to be standardized to demonstrate a common core of information all Americans should know.
Quick, what's the 48th state admitted to the union? Who cares? Yet this factoid is regularly asked on citizenship tests. An understanding of oncepts such as "a trial by a jury of one's peers" or the "freedom to assemble" is more important, commission members agreed.
Meanwhile, as much as we promote family values in this country, immigration policies do not support families.
The wait to bring spouses or children of citizens to the United Stats is 4 1/2 years long. As far as siblings go, we're now taking people who applied 46 years ago, commission Executive Director Susan Forbes Martin said. Which does not reunify families, the stated goal.
Policies should follow what Jordan called "a simple yardstick: people who should get in do get in, people who should not get in are kept out; and people who are judged deportable are required to leave."
Right now that's not the way it works. The commission hopes its finding will change that.